Subject: PKIX minutes

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 16:57:32 -0400

PKIX WG Meeting 3/20/01
Edited by Steve Kent (WG co-chairs)

The PKIX WG met once during the 50th IETF. A total of approximately 
155 individuals participated in the meeting.

Tim quickly reviewed the agenda and document status, noting that 
there are many  I-Ds in progress. (see slides)

Two new RFCs:
	RFC 3029	Data Validation and Certification Server
			(Experimental)
	RFC 3039	Qualified Certificates (Proposed Standard)

In the IESG Review Process:
	Timestamp Protocol (missing IANA considerations section)
	Attribute Certificate Profile
		(missing IANA considerations section and another issue)

Soon to be Submitted to IESG:
	PKIX Roadmap (Informational)
	Permanent Identifier (Experimental?)
	Repository Locator Service (Experimental)

In WG Last Call:
	Son-of-RFC 2459
	Public Algorithms and Identifiers
	CRMF & CMP
CMP/CRMF Interoperability results?

Close to WG last call:
	OCSPv1 bis

Evolving Specifications
	Technical NR (being revised)
	OCSPv2
	Additional LDAP Schema
	Attribute Certificate Acquisition Protocol
	CP/CPS Framework
	DPD/DPV requirements

New Work
	Impersonation Certificates
	Group Name

Status of RFC 2459bis- Russ Housley (RSA Labs)
	After discussions with ITU-T counterparts, path length 
computation was fixed, in a fashion consistent with the existing PKIX 
documents. Also answered the question "who can issue CRLs," by 
allowing a CA certificate to contain EITHER the keyCertSign OR 
cRLSign bits OR BOTH. Thus only CAs (syntactically speaking) issue 
CRLs, bit it allows creation of an entity that is marked as a CA, but 
which is restricted to signing CRLs. (slides)

OCSPv1 - Ambarish Malpani (ValiCert)
	Moving OCSPv1 to Draft Standard. Interoperability efforts 
going well, including PKI Forum work. Also some minor clarifications 
of the text. Make RSA mandatory, drop required support for DSA. 
(slides)

CMC - Jim Schaad (Soaring Hawk Consulting)
	Updating document, symmetric key distribution ambiguity, 
minor editorial
corrections. Hope to complete updates and get interoperability test data
for progression to Draft in about 6 months. (no slides)

Impersonation Certificates - Stephen Tuecke (Argonne Labs)
	Renamed proxy certificates. Motivation is single signon delegation
support. Intent is to bind a new key pair to a subject alt name and to an
extension that labels this as a proxy certificate. However, there are
conflicts between this proposal and the existing and revised profile (and
X.509). Specifically, the EE is acting like a CA, syntactically, but the
EE certificate does not have the basicConstraints flag set to mark it as a
CA. Thus the path validation algorithm would reject these proxy
certificates. (slides)

DPD/DPV Requirements - Steve Kent (BBN)
	Presentation described revised proposals for DPD and DPV requests and
responses, using ASN.1 strawmen examples. Ended with a plan for progress
on the topic, resulting in selection of a protocol before the next IETF
meeting in August.  Steve Farrell expressed concern that the DPD request
is too complex, contains unnecessary controls, based on a model that does
not require returned paths to be ones that will necessarily 
successfully validate for the client. (slides)

OCSPv2 - Michael Myers (VeriSign)
	Expansion of OCSPv1 to create a candidate protocol for the DPD & DPV
functions. Includes a facility to support nonce relay, by concatenating
new nonces with old ones. Emphasis on reuse of OCSPv1 structures wherever
possible, e.g., with regard to status responses. There are fewer controls
on path construction for DPD vs. DPD, based on assumptions about relative
capability of clients and on perception of likely complexity of
certificate graphs. (slides)

DPD/DPV - Denis Pinkas (Bull)
	For DPV, major focus is valid/invalid response, plus optional proof
returned when needed, e.g., for NR. Can have a small response with Y/N
response and hash as a link to the supporting info. Suggests just a single
path and revocation status data should be returned. For DPD need a path
returned always, unlike DPV. Suggests partial revocation status data might
be returned, if complete data not available. (Both DPD + DPV specify the
target by either supplying a certificate or an Issuer name and serial
number.) Suggestion that CA and EE certificates may not want the same
revocation status data, but Mike Myers disagrees with this distinction.
Proposal for partial responses, e.g., incomplete paths. Argument against
DPV support for a posteriori validation when the time frame is outside of
the certificate validity period. Finally, argues for stateless servers,
i.e., no retry facility in DPD. (slides)

SCVP - Ambarish Malpani (ValiCert)
	Removed XML syntax, and will use CMS as secure enveloping 
mechanism. (one slide)

Group Name - Mike St. Johns (??)
	Motivation is to support a commonly employed OS naming convention in EE
certificates, instead of having to map from a DN. Possible uses in
attribute certificates too. Currently proposed as an OtherName but open to
suggestions for encoding. (slides)

Policy Requirements for TSAs - Denis Pinkas (Bull)
	This is a new ETSI work item. Will complement existing ETSI 
standards on
electronic signature formats, qualified certificates, and a document
addressing policy for CAs issuing qualified certificates. TSA policy will
be based on RFC 2527 and ETSI 456.  Welcome participation and inputs from
PKIX and SMIME WG members. (slides)