Subject: RE: Wildcard certificates

From: Kefeng Chen <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2002 13:20:48 -0400

Both Microsoft IE browser and Netscape browser
accept wild card SSL server certificate.
Microsoft IE has more strict rules on accepting wild card
cert than Netscape browser.

-Kefeng

-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 8:49 AM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Wildcard certificates

I wander if anyone on this list have experience/opinions on using wildcard
names in SSL server certificates.

E.g. having the name *.domain.com  in one certificate instead of having
xxx.domain.com and secure.domain.com as common name in 2 separate
certificates.

Several CA service providers offer wildcard certificates on the market
today.

Talking to Steve Kent in Yokohama, he implied that this practice is against
current standards (but I can't recall how) and that it is known to create
problems in certain environments.

Are there any opinions on the list?

1) Is this braking any standards?
2) What environments have problems with wildcard certificates?
3) What are the problems?

/Stefan

---

From: Peter Williams <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2002 04:51:44 -0700

Folks,

2 issues: (a) wildcards, and (b) using a nominated Root CA 
to issue wildcard certs based on reliance on another certificate.

(a) wildcards

There is nothing in any known standard that constrains 
binding any complying common-name to a PKIX
certificate. It would be improper for any PKI standard to 
contrain applications in their use of names. I&A and access control
functions of OSs (or their apps) are not in the scope 
of PKIX, ISO, etc.

All PKIX applications are allowed, explictely, to
impose applicaiton-specific rules on the handling
of cert paths, once they pass PKIX cert path
processing rules. Cert path processing rules
DO NOT address application-specific matching rules
or processing rules for common-names - which ISO definees
to have local identification-semantics.

In the case of https, the rules of de facto standards
for over 5 years now include handling the binding between 
transport-addresses signalled by the socket (which may be a VPN, 
as known to the local application) and the common-name value.
The facility was introduced in the earliest days of
the secure server tradition - to support MCI's and AT&T's
e-mall concepts.

(2) Root key use/sale

Ive proposed to Valicert that we begin to use (or sell) one of our
Root keys for the following purposes related to wildcards:

An enterprise procures 1 class 3 certificate from verisign, for $300,
each year.

An enterprise procures a couple of additional wildcard certs from  
valicert or A.N.OTHER,  for ALL other server certs required by 
that enterprise. The wildcard cert can support an entire class of "secure
servers" which do not need to be independently keyed, and 
are managed as server group from a single console.

Valicert would use the verisign certificate as an proxy LRA, 
essentially. The wild card cert status could generally track the 
status of the certificate issued by verisign, performing the normal
actions of relying party when deciding whether to not
to rely on the verisign certificate. ValiCerg can properly publish
its decision to no longer rely on any given certificate to all users, 
of course.

If we need to write an ID on this issuing practice, Id be happy
to volunteer. I could also see how the ValiCert WebTrust disclosures 
and controls would have to change to authorize this issuing and 
business practice; this guidance would conform part of the
ID, perhaps.

Mail me here or privately, if you want to discuss this. Making
the WebTrust policy changes would be an interesting project,
that can benefit PKIX more generally than just specifying
the wildcard matters. Id like to transfer some of the
ValiCert exerience in satisfying the webtrust criteria to IETF,
as the way I satisifed the audit requiremnets was really quite 
novel; the  approach could be reused widely by others, in my opinion,
to bring the cost of audit down to <$50,000.

Peter.

-----Original Message-----
From: Kefeng Chen
To: 'Stefan Santesson'; [email-masked]
Sent: 8/28/02 10:20 AM
Subject: RE: Wildcard certificates

-Kefeng

-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Santesson [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2002 8:49 AM
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Wildcard certificates

I wander if anyone on this list have experience/opinions on using
wildcard
names in SSL server certificates.

Talking to Steve Kent in Yokohama, he implied that this practice is
against
current standards (but I can't recall how) and that it is known to
create
problems in certain environments.

/Stefan