Subject: [pkix] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-pkix-certimage-04

From: Stefan Santesson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 04 Dec 2009 10:46:21 +0100

I received a much better image example from James Manger. I updated the
current draft to accommodate this and the recent discussion.

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-pkix-certimage-04.txt

/Stefan

------ Forwarded Message
From: IETF I-D Submission Tool <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri,  4 Dec 2009 00:00:03 -0800 (PST)
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: Russ Housley <[email-masked]>, <[email-masked]>, Leonard
Rosenthol <[email-masked]>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-pkix-certimage-04

A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-pkix-certimage-04.txt has been successfuly
submitted by Stefan Santesson and posted to the IETF repository.

Filename:  draft-ietf-pkix-certimage
Revision:  04
Title:   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate Image
Creation_date:  2009-12-04
WG ID:   pkix
Number_of_pages: 12

Abstract:
This document specifies a method to bind a visual representation of a
certificate in the form of a certificate image to a [RFC5280] public
key certificate by defining a new otherLogos image type according to
[RFC3709].

The IETF Secretariat.

------ End of Forwarded Message

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From: Paul Hoffman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2009 08:58:54 -0800

>current draft to accommodate this and the recent discussion.

And you also *removed* two paragraphs of the Security Considerations section. Do you feel that those security considerations went away when you got the better image example? Removing security considerations that are used in the discussion of whether or not a document should be endorsed by the WG does not feel right in a Security Area WG, much less any other WG.

---

From: Stefan Santesson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 05 Dec 2009 01:19:17 +0100

I proposed to remove them as it is a repetition of what is inherited from
and dealt with in RFC 3709.

I said so in my previous mail.

I apologize if you feel that was done wrongly. We are in a dynamic process
here and I as editor is committed to do my best to reflect the WG consensus.

Please feel free to propose what should be done.

/Stefan

On 09-12-04 5:58 PM, "Paul Hoffman" <[email-masked]> wrote:

> And you also *removed* two paragraphs of the Security Considerations section.
> Do you feel that those security considerations went away when you got the
> better image example? Removing security considerations that are used in the
> discussion of whether or not a document should be endorsed by the WG does not
> feel right in a Security Area WG, much less any other WG.
> _______________________________________________
> pkix mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix

---

From: Stefan Santesson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 05 Dec 2009 12:05:32 +0100

To the issue of security considerations for this draft relative to RFC 3709:

Paul has asked me to reinstall the removed paragraphs, but before doing so I
would like to discuss what the appropriate text would be.

The issue at hand is that the logotype RFC 3709 introduces the ability to
bind graphical elements to a certificate that can be used to enhance UI
representation of the certificate.

Graphics may contain elements that is interpreted as text by the human eye.
It is therefore possible to create graphics that is in conflict with other
data/attributes in the certificate without an application being able to
detect the delta.

RFC 3709 spoke about this issue in the following way:

   It is impossible to prevent fraudulent creation of certificates by
   dishonest or badly performing issuers, containing names and logotypes
   that the issuer has no claim to or has failed to check correctly.
   Such certificates could be created in an attempt to socially engineer
   a user into accepting a certificate.  The premise used for the
   logotype work is thus that logotype graphics in a certificate are
   trusted only if the certificate is successfully validated within a
   valid path.  It is thus imperative that the representation of any
   certificate that fails to validate is not enhanced in any way by
   using the logotype graphic.

My question is:

1) What new additional threat is introduced by the certificate image in
addition to RFC 3709.

2) How do we appropriately describe this

/Stefan

---

From: Paul Hoffman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2009 10:45:30 -0800

>1) What new additional threat is introduced by the certificate image in

This is the wrong question. A better one would be "were the two paragraphs that were removed applicable at all to this proposal". The answer is clearly "yes". The fact that the two paragraphs were not in RFC 3709 is irrelevant, and mostly a criticism of RFC 3709.

>2) How do we appropriately describe this

The two paragraphs you removed both seemed accurate and reasonable security considerations.

---

From: Stefan Santesson <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 06 Dec 2009 23:54:51 +0100

Paul,

I will come back with a proposal on a "slightly" modified version of the
removed paragraphs.

The old ones lacked information about how this issue is related to and
inherited from RFC 3709. As such it gives a false impression of adding more
new security threats on top of RFC 3709 than it actually does.

/Stefan

On 09-12-06 7:45 PM, "Paul Hoffman" <[email-masked]> wrote:

> This is the wrong question. A better one would be "were the two paragraphs
> that were removed applicable at all to this proposal". The answer is clearly
> "yes". The fact that the two paragraphs were not in RFC 3709 is irrelevant,
> and mostly a criticism of RFC 3709.
>