Subject: [Raven] Nevermore ...

From: [email-masked]
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 1999 18:01:11 -0400

Based on what I've read to date, my personal opinion on the questions at
hand have not changed.

   The question is still premature, the problem isn't clear at this time
   and the jurisdiction is wrong.

   We are contemplating a practical quagmire and no less than the tapping
   of every IP protocol not just VoIP.  It undermines the good work of the
   IETF.

   There is the very real risk of arming dictatorships while weakening our
   own society and infrastructure.

   Even if the IETF agrees to this, those seeking to exploit tapping
   technology will probably only win a delaying action before increased
   deployment of various technologies makes much of the tapping provisions
   useless.

   Why should the IETF be the lightning rod for public opinion that will
   follow?  The infrastructure for business over the net is still fragile
   and could be harmed.

   Finally, if laws require tapping -- then it will happen with or without
   the IETF.   If tapping doesn't work then they will try other things to
   meet their ends.  Like, reading our computers emissions, planting Trojan
   horses on our systems, attacking the end-points of the channels
   directly.

Also, to ensure that any further silence on my part is not taken as
 agreement with some position I don't agree with. If a vote were taken
 today, I would say that:

   The case for the IETF to build in tapping capabilities into IP protocols
   has not been made.

Let's pray there is no "Phoenix" list.

David Gamey

Any opinions expressed above are mine and not those of IBM or IBM Security
and Privacy Services.

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---

From: Sandy Harris <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 30 Oct 1999 09:55:57 +0000

[email-masked] wrote:

> If a vote were taken today, I would say that:
> 

Definitely not.

Some have argued that the IETF must do something to support legal wiretap
because there is or will be a legal or marketing requirement for vendors
to support some wiretap capability more-or-less analogous to US CALEA
legislation, which restricts any commercially available encrypted
voice service to provive "law enforcement access".

The IAB and IESG have stated clear policy on this in RFC 1984:

   The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering
   Steering Group (IESG), the bodies which oversee architecture and
   standards for the Internet, are concerned by the need for increased
   protection of international commercial transactions on the Internet,
   and by the need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of
   privacy.

   Security mechanisms being developed in the Internet Engineering Task
   Force to meet these needs require and depend on the international use
   of adequate cryptographic technology. ...

   The IAB and IESG are therefore disturbed to note that various
   governments have actual or proposed policies on access to
   cryptographic technology that either:

   (a) impose restrictions by implementing export controls; and/or
   (b) restrict commercial and private users to weak and inadequate
       mechanisms such as short cryptographic keys; and/or
   (c) mandate that private decryption keys should be in the hands of
       the government or of some other third party; and/or
   (d) prohibit the use of cryptology entirely, or permit it only to
       specially authorized organizations.

   We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers
   and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of
   military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to
   law enforcement agencies, as discussed below.

   The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready
   access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet
   users in all countries.

Anything CALEA-like violates at least one of (b) or (c). The channel
is tappable only if the crypto is inadequate or a third party (the
first two are the communicating parties, of course) has access to
the keys.

This is contrary to existing IETF policy and should be rejected out
of hand, as it has been by many posters to this list.

The only even vaguely plausible argument that has been given for
making an exception to this policy and standardizing some wiretap
mechanism is an argument that doing so would allow auditing of
taps.

This argument is obviously weak, since audited taps are still taps
and should still be rejected on the basis of RFC 1984. It is,
however, the best argument I've seen presented on that side of
the question, so I'll point out other flaws.

First, of course, it is subvertable from either side. Even if
we standardise such a mechanism, and many vendors build it into
their products, and many countries pass legislation to ensure
both that both that communications customers use only tappable
lines and that law enforcement uses only auditable taps,

  Criminals, terrorists, etc. will use strong encryption.

  The sort of government that drags people away in the night
   and provides no record of their fate will use wiretaps
   and wil not provide audit logs.

So it is not clear that any such protocol can achieve useful goals.

Second, the technical problems involved would be large. See
one of my previous posts for a partial list. No-one advocating
this "solution" has posted more than handwaving on how these
problems might be tackled.