Subject: [Raven] Re: What IS acceptable

From: Mark McCutcheon <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1999 11:04:40 UTC-0800

On Fri, 26 Nov 1999 12:15:34 UTC-0500 "C. Wegrzyn"
  <[email-masked]> wrote:

> While all these discussions are interesting, they don't seem to
> be leading anywhere. There are those that think the IETF
> shouldn't spend any cycles (for whatever reason) and there are
> those that do. In working on the Winsock and SNMP committees it
> was always pointed out to people that the "standards" set by
> the IETF are minimums: they set the interopability of the
> products that work on the network. I would suggest that rather
> than fight these never ending religious battles that those
> individuals and companies that think there is a market for
> traceability, should go off and build them. Those individuals
> and companies that don't believe in the cause (for whatever
> reason) shouldn't change their course. Let the "courts" of
> marketplace decided. Perhaps there is a NEW Cisco on the
> horizon that will build such a product, offer it to the market
> and build a whole new empire.

While I agree totally with your first sentence, what follows
seems to miss the point for which this list was set up.
Switch/router vendor engineers in the MEGACO WG insist that that
their market demands "a complete tap mechanism" (1) for the Media
Gateway - Media Gateway Control protocol; and that implementing
this capability requires system design and "alterations to
several protocols" (1) (despite chefren's oft-repeated but wrong
statement that "No modification of existing protocols (no
backdoors)" (2) is being discussed).  This list was set up to
discuss MEGACO's request to the IESG to begin this effort,
according to Brian Rosen, the most outspoken of those vendor
engineers in this forum (1).  We must assume that these companies
know their market, so the "`courts' of the marketplace" have
already spoken.  The issue is not whether these companies will
build tap mechanisms into their media gateways - they will.  The
issue is whether protocols to facilitate this should be
standardized and published by the IETF.

You might be saying that vendors intending to implement tap
mechanisms in their products should be permitted to develop the
required protocols under the auspices of the IETF WG.  This would
at least be responsive to the intention of this list.  But your
following message makes clear that

> ....the IETF should not purposely design any traceable protocol
> and promote it as a standard.

With this statement I wholeheartedly agree - and cannot
understand how any other stance is in accord with the historical
position of the IETF on issues of utility and privacy.  But this
list has exceeded its useful lifetime and I will be unsubscribing
by end of day.

Regards,

Mark McCutcheon | UBC High-Speed Networking | <[email-masked]>

------------
Footnotes:

1. Message from Brian Rosen of Fore Systems:
  
  Send-Date:         Wed, 13 Oct 1999 14:01:54 UTC-0400
  From:              <[email-masked]>
  Authorizing-Users: Brian Rosen <[email-masked]>
  To:                "'Paul Hoffman / IMC'" <[email-masked]>,
                     <[email-masked]>
  Subject:           RE: [Raven] Determination of the need
  
  There is a protocol between the MG and the MGC, and another 
  between MGCs (and for that matter, RTP runs between the
  MGs), to make this work, you probably have to have some
  kind of addition to the protocol that allows an operator,
  from one place, to implement a tap meeting the requirements
  of the court order.  This will involve some participation 
  from the MG and some from the MGC, and possibly other elements.  
  
  One of the reasons this issue exists is because there was
  an effort to implement a complete tap mechanism in the
  MG - MGC protocol (MEGACO).  Several of us pointed out that
  it wasn't possible to solve the whole problem by having
  a feature in one protocol - several other elements have
  to be involved.  It needs a system design, and alterations
  to several protocols to make a minimally functional system.
  That is why we asked the IESG to consider starting this
  effort - doing it one protocol at a time, in isolation,
  made no sense.  We have already started some discussion
  that assumed the data flow was tapped at the service 
  access point from the tapped line.  This implies that the MG 
  doesn't have to have a data tap function unless it
  is in the "edge of the network" role.  It was further 
  pointed out that the MG might be on the suspect's premises,
  and thus it may not be appropriate to do a data tap there,
  so it might be that even if the MG is the edge of the net,
  the tap point is the other end of that wire, say the edge router.
  
  The point again is that we need to take a systems view,
  and decide what has to be done, and then just do it.
  
  Brian

2. Message from "chefren" <[email-masked]> Tue, 9 Nov 1999
     21:43:15 UTC+0100

_______________________________________________
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---

From: Sampo A Syreeni <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1999 23:54:16 +0200 (EET)

On Fri, 26 Nov 1999, Mark McCutcheon wrote:

>their market demands "a complete tap mechanism"

Well. that is one very bad premise in the IETF context where, it seems, most
people value privacy over government control.

>several protocols" (1)

That is even worse. Modifying protocols for something of everyday use to the
people (reaching hosts, as in IPv6) seems difficult enough.

>required protocols under the auspices of the IETF WG.

Currently it would seem the results would end up, at most, as informational
RFC's. And even if something like a consensus is achieved, it is most likely
some people will never convert to the new doctrine out of fear of government
eavestropping, leaving a standard that will not be interoperable.

>list has exceeded its useful lifetime and I will be unsubscribing

Agreed. Commiserations, it seems the list has lost one of the people who
knows what the list was originally intended for.

Sampo Syreeni <[email-masked]>, aka decoy, student/math/Helsinki university

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 00:23:50 +0100

> people value privacy over government control.

Please split that up. "Government" HAS absolute control 
over privacy. If "they" want to enter your house they can. 
It's only afterwards that you can object and get excuses 
from them.

So laws, made by parties selected by the people (you and 
me) have allowed law enforcement (part of government) to 
enter houses in special cases with warrants (stupid paper 
with signatures) that more or less guarantee to you that 
the people who want to enter your house are entitled to do 
so.

Please be specific!

+++chefren

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 1999 15:38:55 -0800

On Tue, Nov 30, 1999 at 12:23:50AM +0100, chefren wrote:
> Real-To:  "chefren" <[email-masked]>
> 

Assuming you're talking about what's legal (versus what's possible),
this is certainly not the case in the United States. Perhaps it is true
in your jurisdiction. 

> Please be specific!

Indeed!

--
Greg Broiles [email-masked]
PO Box 897
Oakland CA 94604