Subject: Re: [Raven] Executive Power / Opinion Toss

From: "Richard Payne" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 09:31:43 -0500

ch*fr*n wrote:

> Tapping is just a means for law enforcement. Law
> enforcement states, and their "bosses" who are in charge
> for us, the people, believe it, that if tapping is not
> possible other means have to be found.

The fact that someone states something doesn't make it true. You've got to
provide some proof, and it's going to have to be very convincing.

Brief background: the FBI and the Justice Department are widely believed to
have been fronting for the NSA on wiretap and encryption issues since at
least the days of the Clipper chip, if not before. Some Clipper design
documents that are now publicly available make it clear, if it wasn't
before, what was driving Clipper. It seems very likely that "key escrow" was
intended all along to make it easier to tap communications, with a bonus
side-effect of getting around the Fifth Amendment, despite all claims to the
contrary.

The U.S. government has, in the past, repeatedly downplayed the need for
strong crypto, and pushed weak standards, with the very unfortunate side
effect that electronic commerce is built on a much weaker foundation than
necessary. Nobody should be using a 512-bit RSA certificate: many are,
because of export restrictions.

Do they have the fable of the boy who cried wolf in the Netherlands? It's
Aesop, so I'd guess so. Most Americans who've been following these issues
for the last few years will by now almost reflexively disbelieve anything
that law enforcement says.

You might convince people on this list that the law enforcement position, as
you understand it, is correct, but you'll have to have, as I said, _very_
good evidence.

ch*fr*n also wrote:

> Yes. If law would allow places to hide for organized crime
> law enforcement cannot do anything against the most vicious
> part of crime.

Since I've asked this question two or three times and haven't gotten an
answer that I understood, I'll ask again, slightly differently.

When do we start designing the auditable,
all-citizens-must-wear-at-all-times microphone/bugging device? After all,
it's well known that criminals often converse face-to-face, and the ends
justify the means.

Richard Payne

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---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 01:46:45 +0100

On 30 Nov 99, at 9:31, Richard Payne wrote:

> The fact that someone states something doesn't make it true.

That's not what I pointed at. I tried to explain that the 
people who are in charge because democratic forces have put 
them in charge may ask for means.

If democratic government would ask you to move a block of 
stone of 1000kg: You can probably say "I cannot" and "I 
need help, of a shovel". Government can choose to ask 
someone else or give you a shovel.

That's the discussion. Law enforcement asks for means to do 
things we, the people, ask them for.

> You've got to provide some proof, and it's going to have
> to be very convincing. 

Not necessarily I would think.

..

> you understand it, is correct, but you'll have to have, as I said, _very_

It just happens I have an other view on it. I think my view 
is more realistic but I cannot prove that of course.

> it's well known that criminals often converse face-to-face, and the ends

Please believe me I don't want skip questions.

Yes I give in it's a race between criminals and law 
enforcement with privacy in the middle to dismay of 
probably all of us.

So we need measures that preserve as much privacy as 
possible in "the race".

Strange enought the only thing we can do is keep crime as 
high as we can tolerate.

The "the auditable, all-citizens-must-wear-at-all-times 
microphone/bugging device" is only necessary if the device 
that makes that the only measure to keep crime under enough 
control widespread among criminals.

If you want to meet that moment as soon as possible: Do far 
better marketing for encryption and the user model of it, 
develop an automatic private encryption for GSM phones, 
implement IPsec everywhere you can.

Do =I= really have to tell You??? I guess so: The things 
you encryption believers do really bad is the package, the 
automation, the user interfaces, and the marketing.

Please don't ask me for help, I definitely don't want to 
push the encryption race.

+++chefren