Subject: [Raven] Re: Executive power

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 20:47:04 +0100

On 30 Nov 99, at 14:18, Ray Yang wrote:

>      We're not talking about making tapping IMPOSSIBLE, we're talking
>        about
> keeping it from becoming trivially EASY.

Sorry it IS trivially easy tcpdump is a utility that exists.

> Making a standard => standard
> method which can be replicated over and over again by automation =>
> trivially easy =>

The proposed auditable standard is hard to automate because 
all involved parties.

We also came up with the idea to let the tapbox send 
checksums to Usenet so all actions can be verified 
afterwards.

+++chefren

=Signature follows=

I think we need a simple architecture for a point
to point tap interface that has strong provisions
against misuse.

On one side the communication provider who only
starts tapping a specific customer or IP number
with proper warrants.

On the other side the approved tapping room.

Everything should be organized by a central
"tapping office". This office should provide
keys for strong encryption to both communication
provider and tapping room.

Law and technology should both provide as
much checks and balances as we can come up
with. Law can provide good procedures,
technology can provide technical means to
check them or force them.

=Large signature ended. If you want to
help to setup a standard for the above
design, please contact me.=

_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
[email-masked]
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 11:57:29 -0800

> Sorry it IS trivially easy tcpdump is a utility that exists.

It's easy to tap, but difficult to get anything useful, given the
existence of strong cryptography. Because strong crypto exists and is
used, tcpdump is uninteresting except as an aid towards traffic
analysis; and for that, better tools exist. Many people have been using
the network for personal and business reasons using crypto to foil
eavesdroppers for years now; system administrators and firewall
administrators commonly disable protocols which allow or require the use
of plaintext for sensitive (or any) data.

This situation will only improve as IPSEC and IPv6 become more
widespread.

tcpdump is dead; you can continue to assert that it "exists", but the
reason nobody's interested in your song-and-dance about tcpdump is
because it's coming 10 years too late.  

--
Greg Broiles [email-masked]
PO Box 897
Oakland CA 94604

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 00:03:18 +0100

> This situation will only improve as IPSEC and IPv6 become more

Improve or worsen?

> because it's coming 10 years too late.  

You forget law enforcement is used to getting little 
evidence. As I said before: They would be very happy with a 
motion 3d represenation of a crime but they are still very 
happy with fingerprints.

Encrypted data often has very strong fingerprints and it 
will undoubtly help with making a trafic analyses and thus 
get a view of the organzation structure.

HOWEVER: This is not up to us but to the democratically 
selected people who make laws. For now they demand all 
communication to be tapable in The Netherlands.

+++chefren

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 30 Nov 1999 15:15:26 -0800

> communication to be tapable in The Netherlands.

You're thinking backwards.

Law follows politics follows money follows technology.

We have some influence on lower levels of that "protocol
stack", and I have no problems making technical decisions
with an eye towards the social effects at higher layers.

-- 
Mark Atwood               | 
[email-masked]             | 
http://www.pobox.com/~mra |

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 15:27:47 -0800

> get a view of the organzation structure.

Your continued use of the fingerprint analogy is misleading;
fingerprints are difficult to forge (though not so difficult to obscure)
and are tied closely to individual people. Network addresses and other
data about network communications are relatively easy to forge, and even
when they're accurate, they're tied closely to computers, requiring
further evidence to establish which person(s) caused the computer to
act, and their mental state regarding the causation and the act.

Correspondingly, your suggestion that "encrypted data often has very
strong fingerprints" is misleading.

> communication to be tapable in The Netherlands.

How unfortunate. Perhaps you'll understand if the rest of the world
prefers to give the Netherlands a few decades to engage in this
experiment with invasions of human rights to see if it enhances or
diminishes the quality of life therein. 

Also, I note that the folks at XS4ALL seem to be having some success
limiting the scope and applicability of wiretapping, as well as with
distribution of cryptographic tools. I get the impression that perhaps
your statements about the popular acceptance and scope of anti-privacy
legislation in NL are somewhat incomplete.

(And, to be fair, it should be noted that the US has its own share of
homegrown surveillance promoters who are similarly motivated to
eliminate everyone's privacy in the name of security or in the
fulfilment of their own voyeuristic tendencies.) 

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PO Box 897 Oakland CA 94604

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 00:42:49 +0100

> You're thinking backwards.

Everythig after "HOWEVER:" is just the state of law here in 
The Netherlands all communication should be tappable. 
That's a fact since December 1998 and it's according to 
current European guidelines.

> Law follows politics follows money follows technology.

I don't see that as a rule of thumb at all...

> with an eye towards the social effects at higher layers.

So you have no problems with an auditable version of 
tcpdump?

+++chefren

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 30 Nov 1999 15:59:44 -0800

> So you have no problems with an auditable version of 

You are misunderstanding me. My politics are such that I contribute my
technical efforts to cause an outcome where, whether your taps are
auditable or not, they are useless.

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 19:45:04 -0500

>So you have no problems with an auditable version of

I'm ready for a dumpable version of tcpaudit.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 03:03:26 +0100

On 30 Nov 99, at 15:27, Greg Broiles wrote:

..

> strong fingerprints" is misleading.

Why?

..

> legislation in NL are somewhat incomplete.

  Xs4all, was more than 1 year ago taken over by the
  formely state run KPN-telecom which made the 5 owners
  milionaires. They may still distribute cryptographic
  tools. They did run one of the about 8 anonymizers in the
  world (estimated number given by the operator), I don't
  know the current status of those projects. 

> fulfilment of their own voyeuristic tendencies.) 

Eh please: I'm against backdoors in encryption protocols, 
new or old. I'm just for an auditable standard of tapping. 
If the data is encrypted: Other problem.

+++chefren

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 03:04:53 +0100

+++chefren

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 30 Nov 1999 18:50:26 -0800

> So you have no problems with an auditable version of 

Go ahead and design one. Form a mailing list. Write a working
draft. You dont need any IETF blessing or cover to do these things.
Build hardware. Try to sell it.

I wont help you.

And tho I do not speak for the IETF or anyone else, I doubt that most
people who volunteer time to be on WGs will want to volunteer free
assistance to help you.