Subject: [Raven] CIO.com column on IETF & wiretapping

From: Declan McCullagh <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 10 Nov 1999 12:02:52 -0500

>From: [email-masked]
>To: [email-masked]
>Date: Wed, 10 Nov 1999 11:38:28 -0500
>Subject: my readers on the IETF
>
>
>
>Dear Declan,
>
>I write an interactive column called "Sound Off" on CIO.com (a website for
VPs
>of technology, CIOs, etc.).  Last week, I wrote about the IETF and their
debates
>over writing wiretapping capabilities into next generation Internet
protocols.
>The column has produced some spirited and insightful responses that I
think the
>IETF would be interested to see.  Any advice on how to alert the members,
>meeting this week, to the existence of the debate?
>
>The column and posted responses are at:
>http://comment.cio.com/sound.cfm?ID=22
>
>Many thanks,
>
>Martha Heller
>Web Writer
>CIO.com
> 

_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
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---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 16:31:51 +1100

Is there a desire to widen the previous discussion which had a very narrowly
focussed issue?

It seems to me that the original "should" question can be rephrased, with
potential for a better-than-now outcome.
A suggested rephrasing
"Will the IETF or any other standards body produce protocols or standards
that reduce scope for abuse of traffic monitoring by any entity?"

Despite the excellent work in the IETF and other standards bodies, no
standards body anywhere has ever ratified a tap-proof protocol or standard.

[to stimulate thinking, if not flame-bait]
The IETF (and all other standards bodies) has always produced or ratified
standards and protocols that _in_practice_ are tapping capable, or
inherently enabled (e.g. IP packets).
In practice, all security protocols rely in external entities - DNS, ISP
cache, CA's etc and application vendors to get it right.
SSL (see http://www.iol.ie/~fod/sslpaper/sslpaper.htm) and S/MIME (do you
trust the CA, the application, and your OS?) are examples where the protocol
inherently permits tapping, or requires human mediated security decisions
and external reliance.  Human mediated security decisions are typically bad
ones - very few of us are expert security administrators.

There obviously are some, limited though valid grounds for monitoring to be
possible - systems administration, company policies about unnacceptable
content etc, and for some, law enforcement.  Well used, monitoring has the
potential for "greater good" benefits.

While the exact use of monitoring is a policy matter outside the technology
realm of the IETF or other standards groups, the capability to define a
standard for reliable, un-abusable monitoring is.  "Policies" exist across
the spectrum of laws, rgulations, company standards and personal values.
While policies can change over time, the need to detect abuse does not.
There are solutions to the issue of detecting abuse.

Some possibilities which require open review include, but are not limited
to:
- End to end encryption with self-escrow (this allows you to voluntary prove
you either _did_ or _did_not_ send a specific message at a specific time -
current PKI proposals are some years from sufficient stability for usability
in this latter role).
- End to end encryption through a self-chosen trusted third party gateway
("trusted third party gateway" is a concept term, to be defined later)
- Tamper-resistant access devices.  Conceptually, a STU-III style device in
a PDA form-factor, on security-steriods.

Anyone (law enforcement or otherwise) can monitor today without significant
fear of detection, let alone punishment.

Do we, as a community of Internet users, wish to improve on todays
situation, or leave it "as is"?

Regards,
Lyal

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of
> Declan McCullagh
> Sent: Thursday, 11 November 1999 4:03
> To: [email-masked]
> Cc: [email-masked]
> Subject: [Raven] CIO.com column on IETF & wiretapping
>
>
>
>
> >From: [email-masked]
> >To: [email-masked]

---

From: Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 12:13:46 +0000

> standards body anywhere has ever ratified a tap-proof protocol or standard.

Since you claim that SSL (and, presumably, IPSEC) are not tap-proof, or
not ratified, I'm not sure which, I'm intrigued to know what would
satisfy you? A protocol running on a OS running on a machine all
designed and built by the IETF? Using IETF approved sand as the starting
point?

Cheers,

Ben.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html

"My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those
who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the
first group; there was less competition there."
     - Indira Gandhi