Subject: FW: [Raven] Re: Raven, What's Needed...

From: Chris Savage <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 10:46:28 -0500

>-----Original Message-----
>From: chefren [mailto:[email-masked]]
>Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 1999 10:28 AM
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: Re: [Raven] Re: Raven, What's Needed...
>
<snip>

>I doubt that. Without an offer from the technical side laws 
>have no "base". We can't expect lawyers to say reasonable 
>things about technical things while they have no knowledge 
>about it.

And vice versa?

Chris S.

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From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 17:11:47 +0100

> >things about technical things while they have no knowledge 

Same. Unfortunately the techies here do say things about it.

Seen from the other side everything is in place now:

Tappability is required as it was with other technical 
communication methods like snailmail, telephone, telex and 
fax. The lawyers have some experience with the first 
technical offerings for Internet tappings and have 
concluded that it's unacceptable to get information from 
other persons/organisations than were they have a warrant 
for.

So now the techies have to show what's possible.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 11:19:59 -0500

At 01:47 PM 10/11/99 -0400, The IESG wrote:
 >  "should the IETF develop new protocols or modify existing protocols
 >  to support mechanisms whose primary purpose is to support wiretapping
 >  or other law enforcement activities"

Chefren, do you agree that the preponderance of people posting to this list 
have answered the question above essentially as  "No." ?
 >
 >  and
 >
 >  "what should the IETF's position be on informational documents that
 >  explain how to perform message or data-stream interception without
 >  protocol modifications".
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

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From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 17:46:22 +0100

> have answered the question above essentially as  "No." ?

(Hm... Aren't you spoiling a thread?)

I have no problems with you concluding as such, the IETF 
chairman wrote only some days ago:

On 23 Dec 99, at 13:27, Fred Baker wrote:

> The purpose of this list, in the words of its first email, is to discuss
> and potentially answer two questions:
> 

It seems to me that if he didn't conclude the discussion is 
over and/or the answers are there we may go on with 
discussing.

Some people here seems to like a type of discussion with 
lots of "yes/no/yes/no/yes/no", I prefer to see as much 
information around the problem as possible so we can all 
learn as much as possible and we can oversee more before we 
conclude.

More information, better conclusions.

Maybe we should target some old controversies here. You 
probably want to know the reasons why the list isn't closed 
yet and I, and probably also Richard, want to know when at 
last the EU directives have to become laws and which 
countries beside The Netherlands have implemented the tap-
directives already.

Who knows?

+++chefren

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 08:53:31 -0800

On Tue, Dec 28, 1999 at 05:11:47PM +0100, chefren wrote:

> The lawyers have some experience with the first 

This is somewhere in between confusing and confused. I don't remember
any messges from any EU-based attorneys. I've written about the rules of
evidence in the US and their (lack of) requirements for "tappability",
and Chris Savage has written about CALEA's requirements, which haven't
included "tappability", though he did point out that the FCC seems
perfectly willing to accept a surveillance configuration where the
information provided by telecommunications carriers to the eavesdroppers
goes substantially beyond that required by the applicable warrant, e.g.,
precisely the opposite of the situation you describe above.

In particular, your statements about "what the law requires" are wildly
incorrect with respect to US law - both federal law and the state laws
I've run across. Now, I don't fault you for being unfamiliar with the
laws of places you don't live nor do business - and I'll cheerfully
admit that the only things I think I know about NL law I learned from
other people's messages on the net and media reports, both of which are
notoriously unreliable and incomplete, such that I'm not comfortable
making any claims about it at all upon which others should rely.

However, to the extent that you claim to report on topics beyond your
experience and competence (e.g., US law, and perhaps NL and EU law?), I
think you're behaving irresponsibly and misleadingly.

In particular, at least in the US, non-attorneys may end up with a
reasonable familiarity with some aspects of our legal system through a
general course of education; but only in the rarest of cases do
non-attorneys get training in or exposure to our various rules of
evidence, e.g., the rules and standards by which information is made
available to the finder of fact in a trial. Before I went to law school,
I had no idea they existed, and I believe my experience was typical in
that regard. If you want to discuss that topic - and that's what you're
doing, when you say "the law demands auditable taps" - it would be
appropriate for you to engage in some study of the law as it stands
currently. My impression is that you have not done so, with respect to
either NL or US or any other legal system. If that is not the case, I
apologize, but I will expect you to be much more forthcoming with
citations to authorities to support your claims. (They should be
easily at hand if you have done the research.) 

--
Greg Broiles [email-masked]
PO Box 897
Oakland CA 94604

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From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 18:49:27 +0100

> think you're behaving irresponsibly and misleadingly.

As I admitted earlier, I exagerate if you look at current 
laws, for example in the US. The direction in which I 
"exagerate" isn't unrealistic at all since the laws are in 
place in The Netherlands, Australia and probably more 
countries. As fare as I see it others unrealistically 
exagerate about "potential misuse" of taps by governments 
since that can be stopped almost 100% with good laws and 
technical auditability. (They allergically talk about 
tapping while the chances of abuse/misuse can easily be set 
to nearly zero with good standards.)

I don't think its irresponsibly or misleading to look as 
much forward as possible.

The "safe harbour" approach leads to isolated and temporary 
solutions that don't have a serious future, at most to a an 
inferior technical standard.

If we talk about =standards= those standards should 
technically be as good as possible and wise with respect to 
society.

+++chefren