Subject: [Raven] Re: Thoughts of IESG and IAB members on Raven

From: "Callaghan, Robert" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1999 08:39:30 -0800

Please excuse an outsider's attempt to summarize and then to attempt to aid
in closure.

There appears there is agreement on some things:

1) No one like the concept of wiretapping.  For some it is unethical.

2) Tapping an IP stream is possible today using TCPDUMP.  This requires no
changes or additions.

3) Tapping may not useful when the data stream is encrypted.  (Nothing new.
Encrypted voice is possible with analog telephones.)

4) It is necessary that individual service providers comply with a legally
mandated order to wiretap.  (Legal is defined locally and not necessarily by
U.S. definitions. In some cases what is locally legal is abhorrent to an
American.)

The question then is should IETF be an actively involved or a passive
observer in the processes created by these facts?  And further, if the IETF
is an active participant, should this participation be positive or negative?

For some background, wiretapping has existed as long as telegrams,
telephones, internet, etc. have existed.  Sometimes these were legal, and
sometime not.  The wiretap information has been useful for legal LEA
activities.  These activities in the U.S. and many other countries are
controlled though court orders based on independent probable cause.  These
court orders define what may be collected.  Many times, the orders do not
allow for an information tap, but only connection information.  Classically
this was obtained by a pen recorder.

The LEA has realized that modern technology has blocked the use of pen
recorders, analog recorders and other classical recording technology. (Dah!)
It is now being required that the classical services be available in the
world of new technologies.  They also want the same cost of service as was
possible with the classical tools (Free).

The service providers are receiving these court order where non-compliance
has a high risk.  The court order does solve, nor discuss the costs.  It
only demands compliance.  It is possible to comply today using high cost
tools with the unlikely reimbursement of these costs. As stated above, the
order states what information can be obtained and in what time frame.

Let us take an example.  The service provider receives an order to supply
connection information.  It actives TCPDUMP and provides all information
with the correct IP address.  In that this stream contains content
information which is outside of the court order, the service provider is not
protected by the court order for invasion of privacy.  Now what happens.

Therefore, for me the question should not be "should IETF modify the
protocols in order to allow tapping?"  This question is mute because the
current protocols can be tapped.  The questions should be should the IETF
modify protocols in order to assist services providers in limiting taps to
that required by the court order?  And secondly should the IETF help the
service providers by establishing protocols and procedures that allow for an
efficient, secure, and traceable tapping mechanism?

------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Callaghan
Siemens Information and Communication Networks
Tel: +1.561.997.3756	Fax: +1.561.997.3403
Email:	[email-masked]
------------------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
[email-masked]
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven

---

From: Mark Gaynor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 1999 11:58:48 -0500 (EST)

I have one comment to point (1) See below:

Bye
Mark

> 1) No one like the concept of wiretapping.  For some it is unethical.

Not true, if my kid (or any kid) is kidnapped, I want LE to be able to
do whatever will help slove the crime. So in some cases, I am for
wiretapping. How many parents are reading this that would not want LE to
be able to use wiretapping to slove crimes against kids?

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 07 Dec 1999 09:41:35 -0800

> be able to use wiretapping to slove crimes against kids? 

"Necessity is the plea of every infringement of human freedom. It is
 the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves."

-- 
Mark Atwood               | 
[email-masked]             | 
http://www.pobox.com/~mra |

---

From: James Carlson <[email-masked]>
Date: 07 Dec 1999 13:03:56 -0500

> be able to use wiretapping to slove crimes against kids? 

Well, at least one.  I'm the father of two, and I'm not willing to
sacrifice protocol security on the theory that maybe, someday, somehow
a wiretap involving IP data could possibly be used to solve a crime
against my kids.  I don't want my kids to live in such a police state
and I don't believe the tradeoff is fair or justified.

If the police can't do their jobs without breaking IP security, then I
agree with the other posters.  The police who can't do their jobs
should speak up and say so.  That they're not speaks volumes.

-- 
James Carlson, System Architect                     <[email-masked]>
IronBridge Networks / 55 Hayden Avenue   71.246W   Vox:  +1 781 372 8132
Lexington MA  02421-7996 / USA           42.423N   Fax:  +1 781 372 8090
"PPP Design and Debugging" --- http://people.ne.mediaone.net/carlson/ppp

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 07 Dec 1999 10:17:43 -0800

>be able to use wiretapping to slove crimes against kids?

Seems like this logic would also legitimize interrogation by torture and 
warrantless searches and seizures, too. A distraught parent would likely 
support those tactics were their child in danger - but most civilized 
places have agreed that it's necessary to at least pretend they don't allow 
those practices. Are you suggesting that we should eliminate law and just 
use arbitrary force against people we fear might harm our children?

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PGP: 0x26E4488C

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 1999 19:24:38 +0100

> should speak up and say so.  That they're not speaks volumes.

They do but you and others here and elsewhere are so 
"rabiate"(?) that you don't hear it at all.

It has come so far now that laws are passed and equipment 
is unsellable because the communication networks you can 
configure with them are not tapable.

+++chefren

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 1999 19:20:05 +0100

>  the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves."

Single sided view?

"Necessities" should be described carefully and discussed 
in parliaments, if parliaments agree and if needed, they 
can provide laws that met the requirements of the 
necessities.

If taps are helpfull to solve kidnapping, and they are, 
phonelines of people with kidnapped relatives are probably 
always and anywhere in the world tapped for that purpose, 
laws have to be in place to allow people to do so.

+++chefren

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 1999 21:30:07 -0800

>laws have to be in place to allow people to do so.

Are these taps installed with the permission of the relatives? If so, no 
special tap infrastructure is necessary. If not, "always and anywhere in 
the world" is incorrect.

It is useful to distinguish between two-party notification of taps (both 
communicators know of a recording being made), one-party notification (one 
of the communicators knows of the recording), and no-party notification 
recording (neither communicator knows of the recording). For conference 
calls, I suppose that nomenclature can be generalized to "n party", "n -1 
party", "n - 2 party" .. down to "0 party" notification.

Also, does it make sense to design every network and telephone system in 
the world around the crime of kidnapping? Perhaps it's very common in your 
area, but in many places it's very rare, and much more rare where those 
kidnappings involve a ransom demand which would be recorded/traced with 
eavesdropping or wiretap equipment.

In the United States, for example, "kidnapping" is frequently charged in 
connection with armed robbery, rape, or murder - but the kidnapping is 
completed without any communication to outsiders, and occurs incidental to 
another crime. It's very, very unlikely that modifications to network and 
telephone infrastructures will affect those crimes, which are themselves 
very rare, statistically speaking.

I realize that your local crime patterns may be different, but that would 
seem to suggest that a global solution is inappropriate.

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PGP: 0x26E4488C

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1999 09:10:40 -0500

"EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Center), EFF (Electronic Frontier 
Foundation), and the ACLU have asked a federal appeals court to block rules 
that give the FBI power to determine appropriate wiretapping capabilities 
for new communications systems. The groups claim that the levels of 
surveillance the FBI wants exceed what it is entitled to under the law."

http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/calea/release_11_18_99.html 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-11/18/155l-111899-idx.html 
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2397376,00.html?chkpt=zdnntop

--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1999 18:56:37 +0100

> special tap infrastructure is necessary. If not, "always and anywhere in 

  Hm... Now I think of it, in England even taps with
  permission of one of the speakers are forbidden without
  a very audible beep every 10 seconds. 

> party", "n - 2 party" .. down to "0 party" notification.

I don't think it is very useful to distinguish any further 
for us techies. Laws demand tappable networks and equipment 
makers cannot sell equipment if the equipment doesn't allow 
tapping.

> eavesdropping or wiretap equipment.

It doesn't make sense to discuss this here, network 
equipment that allows tapping of individuals is what 
equipment makers have to deliver. Equipment that doesn't 
allow tapping isn't sellable.

+++chefren

---

From: Seth David Schoen <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1999 10:50:27 -0800

> makers cannot sell equipment if the equipment doesn't allow 

Interesting, I can walk two blocks to my local Cisco reseller and pay cash
for a Cisco 2501, no third-party/LEA access anywhere that I know of.  They
might look at me a little funny...

I think you are exaggerating the implications of a few laws in a few
countries, and confusing a public policy objective that you believe in
with the state of current legal requirements.

Even if the _best_ hardware for a particular task has third-party tap
functionality, or the _standard_ hardware has third-party tap functionality,
that hardly means that everybody setting up a network, even VoIP, ends up
building a remote-tappable network.

Lots of companies are deploying VoIP with end-user PCs as the gateways.
This is not as efficient as having a high-end PBX or router do that work,
and ultimately not as cost-effective, but the technology is conveniently
available now, and -- oops -- you can have strong end-to-end encryption
if you want.  A fast CPU, a DSP, and a NIC on the same PCI bus -- that's
a secure telephone, and it exists in _millions_ of computers around the
world, many of them connected to the same public network.  It's even legal
to use in most jurisdictions. :-)

Oh, I know most people don't quite have the software yet, but that's a minor
implementation problem. :-) :-)

With two servers and standard off-the-shelf routers from any vendor, you
can have your own VPN.  I'm setting this up today as part of my job.  That
produces a plausibly untappable network, and _anybody_ can build it.  I
consider this an astonishing engineering triumph; you might consider it a
terroristic threat to society.  You'll find that debate in dozens of books
and newspapers and newsgroups and mailing lists; but the engineers have
been trying to create these systems for _years_, and it seems that only
this decade have they become practical enough for general use.

And, when not sold as integrated hardware for specific purposes -- still
absolutely legal in most jurisdictions.  (Maybe it's a hardware vs. software
thing -- the hardware people in certain areas are used to LEA requirements,
the software people are used to strong end-to-end encryption.)

The legal pressure is being put on the vendors of extremely high-end and
sophisticated equipment (in which I include all telephony because I
don't understand it).  That doesn't mean that _all_ hardware vendors have
to include LEA stuff -- in the vast world of network hardware, it's very
much the exception rather than the rule, and only seen in specific areas.
It's just not true that "laws demand tappable networks".  In some places
they demand taps from specific kinds of entities that provide specific
kinds of services.  If you are a hardware vendor who specializes in high
end stuff that those specific entities are fond of buying, it makes sense
that you would be worried about that.  Beyond that, most "software people"
will say that it is a bad precedent in _so many_ senses to even begin
speculative planning for facilitating wiretaps.

There is also the much more important question of why something being
against the law implies that it is wrong or useless to try to do it.  But
I don't have time for that this moment.

-- 
Seth David Schoen <[email-masked]>  | And do not say, I will study when I
Temp.  http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/  | have leisure; for perhaps you will
down:  http://www.loyalty.org/   (CAF)  | not have leisure.  -- Pirke Avot 2:5

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 15:30:04 +0100

> might look at me a little funny...

You may buy a router and route your data, the moment you 
route data for other people/parties you get problems with 
the law in multiple countries.

> with the state of current legal requirements.

You may think I exaggerate, the IETF doesn't think so and 
that's why this list exists.

> building a remote-tappable network.

You may nog transfer data for other parties without having 
a tappable network.

> if you want.

Both what's in the transferred data and encryption are not 
the issue.

..

> can have your own VPN.

And you may have that.

>  I'm setting this up today as part of my job.  That
> produces a plausibly untappable network, and _anybody_ can build it.

Sure, use it for him/herselves too. But you cannot use it 
for other people/parties.

> I consider this an astonishing engineering triumph; you
> might consider it a terroristic threat to society. 

My opinion isn't that interesting. 

> You'll find that debate in dozens of books

Engineers have been busy with weapons too, ofter very very 
interesting technology but most of it ends up in the 
"regulated" area.

> the software people are used to strong end-to-end encryption.)

Might well be "most jurisdictions". The problem is NOW that 
at least some =important jurisdictions= don't allow the 
untapable technology anymore.

> don't understand it).

Nope, anybody who does sell communication, analog or 
digital has to comply to the laws and has to provide 
tapability.

>  That doesn't mean that _all_ hardware vendors have

That will end, untappable networks are more and more 
unsellable.

> It's just not true that "laws demand tappable networks".

It is true and you are spreading a lie.

..

> In some places

I don't see why.

> I don't have time for that this moment.

The answer is simple: Economics.

+++chefren

---

From: "P.J. Ponder" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 10:45:58 -0500 (EST)

On Mon, 20 Dec 1999, chefren wrote:

<snip>

> digital has to comply to the laws and has to provide 

This point has been beaten to death, in most readers minds anyway, but
once again there is no universal requirement for tappability of data
traffic; there is no US requirement for tappability on ISPs, for instance,
and the CALEA requirements don't address information services.  

What some people want to see as legal or commercial tapping requirements
just don't exist, and certainly don't exist across the jurisdictions
affected by Internet standards.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 17:03:50 +0100

> and the CALEA requirements don't address information services.

That's right, there is no -universal- requirement for 
tappability.

However there is a -substantial- requirement and that's why 
this list exists.

> affected by Internet standards. 

Some people want standards for tapping so their costs to 
comply to laws are as low as possible.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 10:40:56 -0500

>You may nog transfer data for other parties without having

Giving this the benefit of the doubt, I will simply point out the obvious: 
data is transferred "for other parties" in the quantity of gigs per second, 
right now. Therefor, either the "network" is "tappable" or chefren is in error.

>untapable technology anymore.

If that is true, then untapable technology does not exist because it is not 
allowed. Problem solved.

>digital has to comply to the laws and has to provide

Since they "have to", they do, and problem solved, per the assertions above.

>That will end, untappable networks are more and more

But you've stated they are unsellable now, when you wrote "Nope, anybody 
who does sell communication, analog or digital has to comply to the laws 
and has to provide tapability." Which is it?

Probably no chance you would provide a specific quote of the specific law 
that you feel so sure must be complied with today to provide "tapability"?  ;-)

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 18:20:06 +0100

On 20 Dec 99, at 10:40, Ed Stone wrote:

> >You may not transfer data for other parties without having
> >a tappable network.
> 

OK, next step:

Theoretically a bare IP (tcp/udp) dump may be considered a 
tap.

However, law enforcement doesn't think that's a serious 
option. They want just the data of the person/company for 
which they have a warrant.

(Here comes a part of the "auditable" tap basics, law 
enforcement doesn't want data that they don't have a 
warrant for.)
 
> If that is true, then untapable technology does not exist because it is not 

Unfortunately.

> Since they "have to", they do, and problem solved, per the assertions above.

Unfortunately.

> and has to provide tapability." Which is it?

If you sell communication you need equipment and if you buy 
equipment you are plain "nut's" if you don't demand 
tapability, if you want to buy that option afterwards it 
has proven to be VERY costly.

> that you feel so sure must be complied with today to provide "tapability"?  ;-)

The link to the EC directive that I posted here quite often 
is a nice starter:

http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html

With for example:

  1.3. Law enforcement agencies require that the
  telecommunications to and from a target service be
  provided to the exclusion of any telecommunications that
  do not fall within the scope of the interception
  authorization. 

I would be happy with links to for example Australian laws.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 13:20:01 -0500

At 12:20 PM 12/20/1999 , you wrote:
>option.

Tough. They can leave law enforcement and run for legislative office, and 
make a law (unless of course you can provide us a quote of the law that you 
think requires IETF to modify protocols to facilitate wiretapping now....)

>  They want just the data of the person/company for

All of them? Everywhere? At all times? If so, what an usual grouping you 
have found!!

>enforcement doesn't want data that they don't have a

This list isn't about various witetapping  methodologies you might dream 
of, rather it's about whether or not IETF should create or modify protocols 
in support of wiretapping... You have been reminded of this several times. 
See the initial posts which state the reason for the list.

>has proven to be VERY costly.

Oh, now the proper equipment IS available, but very costly.  I see... But 
the microcode and processors that would be required by your favorite 
tapping would be inexpensive if only IETF would bless a wiretapping 
protocol......  ho, ho, ho... it is the Christmas season!

>lex/en/lif/dat/1996/en_496Y1104_01.html

Very cute quote, but "directives" are not law, and most certainly not law 
where most routers are made (US), nor where most routers are located )US), 
nor where I am sitting. So please state if you wish for US router companies 
to obey EU "directives". If so, shall they also obey Myanmar "directives"? 
Iraqi "directives"? Why not?

And if your EU directives require something, are you saying that the EU 
router companies are not compelled to follow those "directives"? Routers 
that don't satisfy that EU directive are not sold in the EU?  Or terrorists 
sell them in the EU, scoffing at those "directives"!!!   ho, ho, ho......

If routers that obey the EU "directives" are available, why not just export 
them to the US where everyone (according to you) is clamoring for them?

>   do not fall within the scope of the interception

Alligator clips on the red and green wires of the telecom device for which 
the warrant is issued will do that perfectly well. And they are very 
inexpensive, available worldwide!

>I would be happy with links to for example Australian laws.

Neato! We need to follow Australian laws about wiretapping also? Way cool 
the way other nation's laws now command obedience world wide!! Possibly we 
can consolidate the legislatures into one body. Let's get Sweden to make a 
law that political parties in China are to be legalized, and the Falun Gong 
can exercise in public in Tienanmen Square!!
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 12:49:45 -0500

>comply to laws are as low as possible.

Please provide a quotation of the law that you have in mind... What law? 
What country? Please.... a quote of that law???
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1999 00:35:32 +0100

..

> think requires IETF to modify protocols to facilitate wiretapping now....)

IETF has no obligations. "Customers" of IETF have 
obligations, the companies that use IETF standards in their 
equipment.

> All of them? Everywhere? At all times? If so, what an usual grouping you 

The data of the to be tapped person as far as it goes over 
the network of the communication provider.

> in support of wiretapping...

More or less... IMHO it has turned out that my 
"interpretation" of the purpose of this list comes pretty 
close to that of the IETF chairman. Just my humble opionion 
of course.

> You have been reminded of this several times. 

Please take a look at later postings of IETF "officials" 
here.

..

> protocol......  ho, ho, ho... it is the Christmas season!

For GSM tapping the option to make the network tappable 
afterwards has proven to be VERY costly. For the 
Netherlands alone it is said that the Dutch Government paid 
around $25.000.000 to the operators. After that they 
changed the law.

(Joking doesn't help you...)

> Very cute quote, but "directives" are not law,

As I have stated before: They will be law in all EU 
countries within some time. You don't have to believe me 
but please point at information that states other 
information if you keep doing so.

> and most certainly not law where most routers are made
> (US), nor where most routers are located )US), 

There are enough important markets that do need tappable 
networks, EU and Australia for example.

> Iraqi "directives"? Why not?

We, or at least the IETF officials, some others and me are 
talking about serious markets like EU and Australia.
 
> sell them in the EU, scoffing at those "directives"!!!   ho, ho, ho......

Routers have nothing to do with it, if you sell 
communication it should be tappable and the legislators 
aren't interested in how you do so.
 
> them to the US where everyone (according to you) is clamoring for them?

I didn't say they are available. We should discuss about 
what's possible and how things could be set up here. I want 
to make a more serious start but unfortunately lack the 
time to do so now.

> inexpensive, available worldwide!

That's indeed a simple solution for an analog 
telephoneline, with some isolation measurements even 
undetectable as stated in other directives.

However it is by far not sufficient for lines that 
transport data for more persons/companies. Law enforcement 
=only= wants the data of the tapped person/company.

A demand that should be honoured by everyone who is for 
maximum privacy.

> can exercise in public in Tienanmen Square!!

You start looking like a little kid who thinks it's nice 
making splashes in a very small muddy pool on a cold and 
windy day.

You get pretty wet and fun seems to lower already.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 1999 19:32:55 -0500

>talking about serious markets like EU and Australia.

I suppose we are all to chase the rabbit to the next hole.... Here goes: If 
it is about markets instead of laws, then if "customers" want to get the 
email address from those visiting web sites without the permission of the 
address holder, should IETF proceed to modify pop, smtp and http so as to 
support this market demand? Why not?

Now the rabbit runs back to the law hole for round 236.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 13:27:43 -0800

>However there is a -substantial- requirement and that's why 

This list exists for a very different reason, one which seems to get pretty
rapidly ignored by those who post to it.

The purpose of this list, in the words of its first email, is to discuss
and potentially answer two questions:

At 01:47 PM 10/11/99 -0400, The IESG wrote:
>  "should the IETF develop new protocols or modify existing protocols 
>  to support mechanisms whose primary purpose is to support wiretapping 
>  or other law enforcement activities" 
>
>  and 
>
>  "what should the IETF's position be on informational documents that 
>  explain how to perform message or data-stream interception without 
>  protocol modifications". 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Fred Baker	| 519 Lado Drive
IETF Chair	| Santa Barbara California 93111
www.ietf.org	| Desk:   +1-408-526-4257
		| Mobile: +1-805-886-3873
		| FAX:	  +1-413-473-2403

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 13:51:28 -0800

> >  explain how to perform message or data-stream interception without 

Well, since the second question never gets much attention on-list, I'll
give it a shot - 

The IETF should encourage the wide dissemination of informational
documents which explain how to perform message or data-stream
interception without protocol modifications.

I believe that wide dissemination will facilitate the widest and deepest
possible understanding of the weaknesses which allow those
interceptions. I further believe that understanding is beneficial
because it allows users of the affected system(s) to avoid or modify
their use of the systems, and because it will allow designers and
implementers of the affected systems to eliminate or reduce the
weaknesses thus described.

I further believe that there are several mailing lists, websites, and
other forums for dissemination of that information, such that it's not
necessary for IETF to provide yet another vulnerability mailing list. It
would, however, be useful if a list of known holes or vulnerabilities
were indexed by the RFC or assigned port numbers affected, especially
where the vulnerability is part of the protocol and thus not vendor or
implementation-specific.

--
Greg Broiles [email-masked]
PO Box 897
Oakland CA 94604

---

From: Dan Schlitt <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 17:05:31 -0500 (EST)

I was among those who was counted as posting to the list but not
indicating an opinion. The reason that I did not make an explicit
statement of my opinion was that on the face of it the general
requirements of the "law enforcement community" bordered on silly. Any
protocol that facilitated wire taps could and would be circumvented bby
the knowlegable.

The original request for modified protocols came from a working group who
wants to make, through appropriate protocols, an IP network look like the
PSTN. My personal view is that protocols of this type should not be
designed to specifically facilitate taping of conversations using these
protocols. I see nothing particularly wrong with publishing informational
RFPs concerning the mechanisms one might use to intercept those
communications. Such RFCs would be double edged.

But the discussion on the list suggests that there is a broader agenda at
work. To satisfy those demands will require that the basic IP protocol be
altered. There are things that you just can't do on a datagram based best
effort network with multiple paths between end points. We ought not start
down a path that leads here.

/dan

-- 

Dan Schlitt
[email-masked]