Subject: [Raven] wiretaps

From: Robert Marshall <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 1999 22:02:33 -0500

Is't this discussion moot if people begin to use end to end encryption with 
either plugins or the new IPv6? Aren't LEAs going to tap into a bunch of 
giberish?

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From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1999 15:15:25 +1100

Not if LE follow the model of being permitted to bug your access device.
A law has just passed here in Australia permitting this.

Previously, the laws locally, and I suspect in most countries did not forbid
this sort
of activity, and have no form of control or checks in place to preclude
abuse.  No publicly known incident has surfaced where this was done by LE -
of course, sysadmins and virus/trojan writers have been doing this for
decades.

Indirect issues, such as being permitted to bug private property (e.g.rooms)
was open to some interpretation in some jurisidictions.

Do we want to encourage the enforce monitoring of your access device and
mandatory encryption, or   optional encryption and audited proceses for
tapping outside of the user's access device?

LE will get one of the other, the degree of technology based control we
impose on them now and going forward will determine our future rights.

Lyal

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of
> Robert Marshall
> Sent: Friday, 3 December 1999 2:03
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: [Raven] wiretaps
>
>
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From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Dec 1999 09:15:44 -0500

>either plugins or the new IPv6? Aren't LEAs going to tap into a bunch of

There would be traffic analysis capabilities, even with encryption. Some 
people suggest that the world should capitulate to the "request" by law 
enforcement for facilitating tapping of IP, because it will satisfy them 
and privacy can be protected with end to end encryption.

An alternative view, that one can test against history, is that the 
intercept ability is just the first bite at the apple. If they are to be 
able to use the content of intercepts, they must understand it. They will 
"ask" for the ability to decrypt. But then they will need non-repudiation 
of content. They will "ask" for the ability to verify authorship. But then 
they will need to be able to verify who received it. They will "ask" for 
protocols that publish such data.

The debate in Congress over CALEA contained the promise that no new powers 
were sought, and that ISPs and IP traffic was not covered. That seems now 
to be "inoperative".
--
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Ed Stone
[email-masked]
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From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1999 21:30:12 +0100

On 3 Dec 99, at 9:15, Ed Stone wrote:

> "ask" for the ability to decrypt. 

Certainly true. The world will go further and if those taps 
are not enough to reach democratically obtained goals 
ragarding crime rates encryption will inevitably 
be regulated.

+++chefren