Subject: [Raven] Re: Raven, What's Needed...

From: Jim Gillogly <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 01:46:09 +0000

chefren said:
> What law enforcement basically needs is a way to tap only 
> communication for which they have a warrant.
>
> IETF thinks that's an unavoidable need, one that has to be 
> met in standards, and is interested in how this need can be 
> fulfilled in a way that preserves as much citizen rights as 
> possible.

Where and when has the IESG or IETF said this?  You keep assuming
that the purpose of this list is to figure out how it should be
achieved, rather than to address the question of whether it
should be achieved.  The latter is is the purpose of this list.
If the IESG has made a decision opposed to the overwhelmingly
contrary weight of opinion, I've yet to hear of it.

Consensus doesn't mean a majority vote, but neither does it
mean deciding something against the wishes of nearly everyone
in the group.  In the absence of consensus the proper decision
is "no action" rather than taking action based on a tiny
minority's preference.
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Sterday, 2 Yule S.R. 2000, 01:40
	12.19.6.14.10, 12 Oc 18 Mac, Second Lord of Night

_______________________________________________
raven mailing list
[email-masked]
http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven

---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 09:55:55 +0800

I think the impication is that carriers, ISP and ralted comapnies, including
equipment suppliers need to comply with laws.

If the question becomes "Is IETF the bst place to standardise such
capabilities" then I say yes.
I don't want the relevant technical standards set behind closed doors by
network inexperienced (or more correctly, less-experienced) government
officials, but by people with relevant real world experience.

My experience in government suggests the adage "a camal is a mouse designed
by committee" is an understatement

Lyal
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of Jim
> Gillogly
> Sent: Wednesday, 22 December 1999 9:46
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: [Raven] Re: Raven, What's Needed...
>
>
> chefren said:

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1999 22:32:05 -0500

>is "no action" rather than taking action based on a tiny

Well said. And particularly, consensus doesn't mean one must accept that a 
view roundly rejected by a broad majority is that broad majority's view. 
That is quite an Orwellian twist.

The minority seems to be saying, "IETF shouldn't ask its member whether or 
not protocols should be modified to facilitate wiretapping, because they 
will say no... IETF members should only be told to go and modify those 
protocols..."

Surely, if law requires something, those who see it that way would be happy 
for IETF to commission a rigorous, professional analysis of that law, and a 
formal report thereof to the IETF membership? It will include, of course, a 
list of nations whose laws IETF should serve by modifying protocols to meet 
their "requirements".
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 1999 18:59:13 -0800

>by committee" is an understatement

The above assumes that we want any such standards to be good ones. From my 
perspective, if we're going to have surveillance equipment deployed, I want 
it to be expensive, incompatible, frustrating, nonstandard, and in every 
other respect as unpleasant and aggravating as possible for anyone who 
comes into contact with it - whether as a designer, implementor, user, or 
administrator.

This is precisely why the IETF should not be involved, even if some 
companies are subject to laws which require tapping - to the extent that 
the IETF process improves the efficiency or interoperability of things 
subjected to it, it should not be applied to evil things.

I want all of the intelligent people who currently work in common carriers 
or in equipment suppliers to common carriers to quit their jobs in 
frustration and disgust with the horrible things (aesthetically, 
politically, and morally) that they're asked to do. If we are going to have 
a bureacratically imposed surveillance society, let the bureacrats build 
the fucking thing.

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PGP: 0x26E4488C

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 08:02:16 -0500

At 09:59 PM 12/21/1999 , you wrote:
>perspective, if we're going to have surveillance equipment deployed, I 
>want it to be expensive, incompatible, frustrating, nonstandard, and in 
>every other respect as unpleasant and aggravating as possible for anyone 
>who comes into contact with it - whether as a designer, implementor, user, 
>or administrator.
>
>politically, and morally) that they're asked to do. If we are going to 
>have a bureacratically imposed surveillance society, let the bureacrats 
>build the fucking thing.

Similarly, those against capital punishment (it is applied in some 
countries under some laws) generally do not involve themselves in building 
better execution chambers, under the argument that it should be done 
"right". Nor do those against bacteriological weapons (made in some 
countries under some laws) participate in building "better" bac weapons so 
as to make the world a better and safer place.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 14:22:08 +0100

> comes into contact with it - whether as a designer, implementor, user, or 

Ah but is that a reasonable opinion? I don't think so.

In the first place law enforcement people are people like 
you and me who doesn't want to bother about things if they 
can be automated.

In the second place all that "expensive, incompatible, 
frustrating, nonstandard, and in every other respect as 
unpleasant and aggravating as possible" you talk about has 
an unnecessary HIGHER price that has to be payed by the 
citizens, you know, people like you and me.

> This is precisely why the IETF should not be involved,

You definitely have personal and political reasons, the 
IETF isn't a political organization.

> even if some companies are subject to laws which require
> tapping - to the extent that the IETF process improves
> the efficiency or interoperability of things subjected
> to it, it should not be applied to evil things. 

Why do you say "evil things", don't you see you are crying 
like some kind of priest?

Companies like Nortel and Cisco have to make routers that 
are sellable and the current routers, without a tapping 
protocol, aren't sellable.

> I want all of the intelligent people who currently work
> in common carriers or in equipment suppliers to common
> carriers to quit their jobs in frustration and disgust
> with the horrible things (aesthetically, politically,
> and morally) that they're asked to do. If we are going
> to have a bureacratically imposed surveillance
> society, let the bureacrats build the fucking thing. 

I see very little intelligence in your words.

+++chefren

---

From: Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 13:34:25 +0000

> protocol, aren't sellable.

That's weird. People keep buying them.

Cheers,

Ben.

--
SECURE HOSTING AT THE BUNKER! http://www.thebunker.net/hosting.htm

http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html

"My grandfather once told me that there are two kinds of people: those
who work and those who take the credit. He told me to try to be in the
first group; there was less competition there."
     - Indira Gandhi

---

From: Patrick May <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 05:50:05 -0800 (PST)

> IETF isn't a political organization.

     Facilitating wiretapping is a political issue.  If the IETF
continues to promote secure protocols, that is a political decision.
If the IETF chooses to weaken protocols to facilitate tapping, that
is also a political decision.  Mr. Broiles is no more personally and
politically motivated than you are.

 > protocol, aren't sellable.

     That would explain why Cisco is in such danger of going out of
business [*].

QUESTION FOR THE LIST ADMINISTRATOR:
     Has this list served its purpose?  The original questions posed
have been answered.  The clear consensus is that the IETF should not
weaken existing protocols or standardize new protocols to facilitate
tapping.  The only discussion currently taking place seems to be
between people intent on hijacking the list for their own purposes and
those who are attempting to prevent the would-be hijackers from
rewriting history.  Isn't it time to shut down the list?

Regards,

Patrick May

[*] For the benefit of the non-native English speakers on the list,
    that was sarcasm.

---

From: "P.J. Ponder" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 09:29:34 -0500 (EST)

This makes more sense than most of the messages posted here, even
if we don't count the ones from you-know-who.  

(I especially like the idea of the network protocols designed and built by
the bureaucrats.  They may be able to find some surplus Clipper chips
(unused, in mint condition) to help speed up the rollout.)

The US National Research Council report on crypto controls analyzed this
issue of additional government security controls versus additional privacy
and commercial protections for citizens.  That group decided that
strengthening security controls to help support the privacy of law-abiding
citizens and secure commercial transactions made more sense than building
in weaknesses that can be exploited and abused.  

The report was mainly focused on export controls, as I recall, but aren't
we talking about the same issues here?  Building in weaknesses versus
helping secure the network from end-to-end? 

On Tue, 21 Dec 1999, Greg Broiles wrote:
<....>

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 15:04:38 +0100

> That's weird. People keep buying them.

The whole problem is precisely that the larger 
communication companies are starting to halt buying them.

+++chefren

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 15:20:40 +0100

On 22 Dec 99, at 5:50, Patrick May wrote:

>      Facilitating wiretapping is a political issue.

Sure, and they decided it's needed and stated so in laws, 
just as they did with radio-interference that should be 
kept in check and CE.

So now it's a technical issue.

> If the IETF continues to promote secure protocols, that
> is a political decision. 

I don't see why, secure protocols are definitely needed.

> politically motivated than you are.

Eh sorry Sir...

  WHERE DID I (or anybody else) STATE IETF SHOULD CHOOSE TO
  WEAKEN PROTOCOLS? 

>      That would explain why Cisco is in such danger of going out of

This is a problem for the business as a whole.

>      Has this list served its purpose?

Chairman didn't think so a few weeks ago and about nothing 
happened since.

> The original questions posed have been answered.

They were misinterpreted by a large part of the list.

> The clear consensus is that the IETF should not
> tapping.

First point: YES, second point: NO.

> The only discussion currently taking place seems to be

No. We just started. In the first phase of this list people 
were educated about tapping, that auditability is a serious 
and desirable issure. In the second phase the list as a 
whole had to admit laws that demand tapability are in place 
in important jurisdictions of this world.

And now we have started talking about possible solutions.

You may unsubscribe if you wish of course.

> [*] For the benefit of the non-native English speakers on the list,

Ah...

+++chefren

---

From: Patrick May <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 06:44:38 -0800 (PST)

[email-masked] writes:
[ . . . ]
 > First point: YES, second point: NO.

     Interesting assertions.  Since you seem to have forgotten, the
original purpose of this list was to answer the following question:

        "Should the IETF develop new protocols or modify existing
        protocols to support mechanisms whose primary purpose is to
        support wiretapping or other law enforcement activities?" 

The clear consensus after considerable discussion was "No."  Please
explain how this question was misinterpreted "by a large part of the
list".  Please also explain why you disagree that no consensus was
reached regarding the development of new protocols.

[ . . . ]
 > And now we have started talking about possible solutions.

     Since the consensus was that such protocols SHOULD NOT be
developed, there is no need to discuss how to develop them.

 > You may unsubscribe if you wish of course.

     And leave you to hijack this list in an attempt to legitimize
your position by associating it with the IETF?  I think not.

Sincerely,

Patrick May

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 09:52:00 -0500

At 08:22 AM 12/22/1999 , chefren wrote:
> want

We don't automate trials to make them more efficient, less time-consuming, 
less expensive, less frustrating, less aggravating, easier, or quicker. For 
good reason. Generally, the police are very unhappy with the "inefficiency" 
of trials.  Should the police view of "efficiency" guide our judicial 
structures and processes, as well, or only surveillance issues? Why do you 
draw the line there?

>citizens, you know, people like you and me.

Just as we pay for the inefficiency of trials? Just as we tolerate some 
crime due to our rejection of torture (in some countries under some laws)?

>IETF isn't a political organization.

An organization that is not a "political organization" is not devoid of 
policy interests and beliefs of its members. For example, the Girl Scouts 
is not a political organization, but they have policies and avocacy against 
certain behaviors toward children that are in some jurisdictions legal.

>protocol, aren't sellable.

Sir, you are becoming hysterical and disconnected from fact in your 
desperate attempt to justify IETF modification of protocols to facilitate 
wiretapping. Now you want us to believe that Nortel and Cisco have only 
unsellable routers on their shelves.

One year ago, Cisco stock was at $45/share. Yesterday it closed at 
$104/share. That is a new 52-week high. Six days ago it was selling for $95 
per share. It has a price/earnings multiple of 173, and a market 
capitalization of 356 billion dollars. The current stock price is 25 times 
book value. Net sales for the first quarter were $3.88 billion, compared 
with $2.60 billion for the same period last year, an increase of 49%. You 
may wish to advise the investors that Cisco is foundering for lack of an 
IETF protocol modification to support wiretapping.

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 10:18:57 -0500

>communication companies are starting to halt buying them.

Disinformation. Read the financial release of Cisco.

Also, the TIA report that the August US CALEA/FCC ruling points to as the 
description of what CALEA wants, is not due until September 2000. Might 
come in handy if someone wants to modify protocols to satisfy CALEA/FCC 
ruling. But must we hurry, now, quickly, without that detail and without 
legal requirement? You would recommend a review of the legal authority 
before acting upon purportedly legal issues, wouldn't you?

Even per the FCC ruling (now contested in court) the changes that the TIA 
report defines in Sept 2000 (if the FCC ruling is sustained) aren't due 
until Sept 2001..... But that is US law. Don't know about China, Iraq, 
Mexico, North Korea law, etc.....

---

From: Tim Salo <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 10:58:39 -0600 (CST)

We might consider concluding that the ITU is better equiped for this
sort of activity that is the IETF (see below).  If the ITU declines, that
ought to be a hint as to the difficulty of this activity.  (I also suspect
that proceeding with the development of wiretapping protocols within the
IETF at this point may severely damage our concept of "consensus".)

-tjs

--------------------------------

Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 10:08:27 -0500
To: [email-masked]
From: "A.M. Rutkowski" <[email-masked]>
Subject: ITU Authentication Role

Has anyone from the Security Area been involved in
this?   See also today's Computerwire followup
article.  Who believes the ITU is "better placed"
than the IETF?

--tony

See also
http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press/releases/1999/99-26.html

===================================================
C O M P U T E R G R A M   I N T E R N A T I O N A L
===================================================
http://www.computerwire.com/computergram
San Francisco, California: December 21 1999
Issue Number 3815

+ Experts Recommend ITU for Authentication Role in
   E-commerce

At a meeting of experts at the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) headquarters in
Geneva, Switzerland, the assembled eggheads concluded
that the ITU is well-placed to help standardize
authentication for e-commerce. Fred Cate, a professor
at the Indiana University School of Law, said the
group agreed that the ITU was well placed to help
facilitate electronic authentication. Its chief
qualifications are almost universal country
membership and long experience in negotiating the
sticky politics of cross-border telephone networks.
The rationale for the move is that telecommunications
companies themselves need standardized approaches to
such issues as the policy statements of certification
authorities.

The experts advised the ITU to encourage voluntary,
rather than mandatory, approaches to standardization,
and that it should focus on areas where international
dialog is needed. They further recommended that the
ITU should take a technology-neutral stand and that
it should not impede the development and
implementation of market-based standards. Industry
groups in rich countries don't want to give up their
hard-won privileges. Speaking of which, the experts
called on the ITU to pay particular attention to the
needs of developing countries, where the lack of
standards could prevent markets growing or put
corporate profits at risk. "E-commerce has reached a
stage where it is critically important to agree on
international approaches in the areas of electronic
signatures and authentication," Cate warned, "if we
don't want to see the emergence of fundamentally
discordant standards."

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 18:58:53 +0100

> [email-masked] writes:

..

> reached regarding the development of new protocols.

Personally I have always tried to look further. With my new 
stance considering "new protocols are needed" I just admit 
I didn't looked far enough.

Looking further was initiated by the IETF chairman who 
described that getting only the right information was a 
problem.

I always thought it was just simply programming a router to 
lead data along a tapbox, my new understanding is that this 
needs a new standard. So all routers can be setup in an 
equal way to do so.

> developed, there is no need to discuss how to develop them.

That consensus was an uninteresting one since it didn't 
address the problem for which this list was setup.
 
> your position by associating it with the IETF?  I think not.

I don't "hijack this list", I didn't wrote much for more 
than a week and almost nothing happened at all, I would 
say: The list should be happy with definitely not-negative 
input.

  [My not very interesting =opinion= is that this list is
  hijacked by lots of unconstructive people that aren't
  interested in the problem at all.]

+++chefren

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 19:10:15 +0100

On 22 Dec 99, at 9:52, Ed Stone wrote:

> good reason.

However we automate as much as possible. So courts are 
equiped with computers and networks and so on.

Or would you like to see them with goose feather pens and 
blobbing ink?

> Generally, the police are very unhappy with the "inefficiency" of trials.

Pretty unreasonable to say so.

> Should the police view of "efficiency" guide our judicial 

The police consists of people and they have to be treated 
reasonably like you and me. If we treat them unreasonable 
we can expect an unreasonable police.
 
> Just as we pay for the inefficiency of trials?

I admit that trials have inefficient aspects but with good 
reason I thought we can all agree.

> Just as we tolerate some crime due to our rejection of
> torture (in some countries under some laws)? 

Do we tolerate that? I wouldn't think so. I would think 
it's pretty well known that torture doesn't guarantee 
people speak the truth.

..

..

> wiretapping.

I wouldn't think so.

> Now you want us to believe that Nortel and Cisco have
> only unsellable routers on their shelves. 

Strange enough: Yes.

> IETF protocol modification to support wiretapping.

Well, their gear is becoming pretty unsellable to 
communication providers in Europe and Australia if you 
believe it or not.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 13:40:47 -0500

>communication providers in Europe and Australia if you

No, I don't believe it. But this point is the "commercial demand" point.

The question was "should IETF create or modify protocols to facilitate 
wiretapping". The "justifications" presented by those who say that it 
should have been along two separate lines of reasoning: 1. the law requires 
it; 2. customers demand it.

While the meeting and the discussion list has, by talley, represented a 
general consensus that IETF should NOT create or modify protocols to 
facilitate wiretapping, you alternately move between point #1 and point #2.

To be direct, those at the meeting and writing to this list, by talley, 
have stated a predominating view that IETF should not create or modify 
protocols to facilitate wiretapping. But you continue to suggest:
a) IETF members say we must
b) the law says we must
c) commercial demand says we must

All three are unsupported assertion.

If IETF members say we must, neither the meeting nor the talley of 
participants here supports that.

If the law says we must, then you will advocate a professional, rigorous 
evaluation of the law and a report to IETF membership thereof.

If commercial demand says we must, then you have DATA to provide about 
Cisco going belly up in Australia and the EU? And if commercial demand is 
reason to support protocol modification, then you'd support mods to pop, 
smtp and http protocols that allow web sites to lift the user's email 
address without his permission or notification? You do know market forces 
would really like that don't you?

The question has been asked and answered: IETF should not create or modify 
protocols to facilitate wiretapping.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 14:59:49 -0500

>communication providers in Europe and Australia if you

Source? May we see the public accounts that describe a decline in sales of 
routers in Europe and Australia, that ascribes said decline to the lack of 
better wiretapping protocols? One article?

I note that Cisco alone has 56 job openings at the moment in the 
Netherlands and Australia.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 21:39:07 +0100

..

> But you continue to suggest:

Concerning a): The IETF chairman suggested so.

Concerning b): The law doesn't say "we" must. To comply 
efficiently with the new laws there are standards needed.

Concerning c): See b).

> All three are unsupported assertion.

I don't think so.

..

> protocols to facilitate wiretapping.

Answered by individuals, not by IETF, and that's why this 
list is still up.

+++chefren

-- 
ii.nl ontwerpt, bouwt én onderhoudt websites
100 Euro aanbrengpremie: http://www.ii.nl/premie

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 13:01:43 -0800

> citizens, you know, people like you and me.

Yes, and that's very good, because it means the police will only use
offensive and intrusive techniques like wiretapping in the most grave
circumstances. I'd be very happy if wiretaps cost, say $10 million or
$100 million each - then they'd only be used when there were no other
alternatives.

Consider the stereotypical threats mentioned by surveillance advocates -
international terrorism, or hostages held for ransom. We'll all agree
that paying millions of dollars to stop those crimes, or to save
innocent lives, is a good use of our tax money.

Consider the stereotypical threats mentioned by surveillance opponents -
police motivated by political or personal vendettas, or who snoop to
satisfy voyeuristic tendencies, or because they're too lazy to interview
witnesses or use traditional investigative techniques. Those uses are
very unlikely where surveillance is very expensive, because they'll
exhaust law enforcement budgets almost immediately, and wrongful uses
will be conspicuous because of their expense. 

My arguments above are not just pie-in-the-sky ideas - legal wiretaps in
the United States (especially those done by federal agents) are
currently subject to a number of regulations which make their use
expensive, which limits their use to what law enforcement think of as
important cases. Now, reasonable people may differ about whether or not
current use is reasonable, but it's clear that the economic costs of
wiretapping have an immediate impact on choices about wiretap use, which
serves to protect the privacy of people in the United States in an
economic (not legal) way, even though the costs are created by law.

On the other hand, where the local police operates without those
economic burdens (such as in Los Angeles, where neither the police nor
the district attorney seem to be familiar with federal law nor the
constitution, and are hence not burdened by their requirements),
wiretapping is widespread and indiscriminate, leading to the violation
of privacy of tens or hundreds of thousands of people, without respect
to any particular investigation, merely because it's a convenient way to
learn about potential arrests or to satisfy a desire for entertainment.

I don't like wiretapping at all - but the biggest difference in what
actually happens seems to be motivated by economics, not law (at least
directly), and I much prefer the way that wiretaps are used at a federal
level. 

(I'm also not necessarily saying that informal (e.g., illegal) wiretaps
don't happen at a federal level, but it seems to be less common than in
Los Angeles.)  

> IETF isn't a political organization.

The IETF cannot (and has not, see RFC 1984) avoid making decisions with
political effects - the only remaining question is whether the IETF
chooses to do so having considered those effects, or having ignored
them.

> like some kind of priest?

I realize that putting your work in a moral context may cause you
discomfort, but I'm not going to apologize, nor stop. Surveillance is
offensive, and widespread institutionalized surveillance is an
abomination and a disgrace. 

> protocol, aren't sellable.

Perhaps you'd like to sell me some Nortel or Cisco shares at, say, half
of their current market price? You could probably make a lot of money
off of the fools on this mailing list who can't see what you see, e.g.,
the imminent failure of non-totalitarian-friendly vendors. 

> I see very little intelligence in your words.

Curiously enough, I was thinking the same about yours.

--
Greg Broiles [email-masked]
PO Box 897
Oakland CA 94604

---

From: "Richard Payne" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 16:01:30 -0500

> say: The list should be happy with definitely not-negative

All those who can think of a hypothesis why the list is quiet when ch*fr*n
doesn't post, raise your hands ;-)

Richard Payne

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 22 Dec 1999 13:16:29 -0800

Tim Salo <[email-masked]> writes:
> ought to be a hint as to the difficulty of this activity.

I would concur. Let the ITU do it, this more in their realm of experience
(and ethics).

-- 
Mark Atwood               | 
[email-masked]             | 
http://www.pobox.com/~mra |

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 22:37:55 +0100

> $100 million each - then they'd only be used when there were no other

That $10.000.000 of $100.000.000 will just be charged to 
the community without further questions. Just think of all 
the smart bombs they throw away at our costs...

> innocent lives, is a good use of our tax money.

If those things, international terrorism, or hostages held 
for ransom, are serious is decided by politicians and the 
results are stated in laws.  

Those laws now demand tappable networks for some time 
already.

> will be conspicuous because of their expense. 

Fantasies.
 
> important cases.

The latter is, taps should only be used for important 
cases, is something we all agree about I think.

> Now, reasonable people may differ about whether or not

The tricky thing that you and others for a reason that 
keeps me puzzling don't want to know is: The laws DEMAND 
tappable networks, at reasonable cost. So the costs are by 
law shifted to the operators of the communication networks.

Got it?

Your "methods" to thwart "the evil system" are nothing less 
than childish.

..

> I don't like wiretapping at all

I think only sick people do like it.

> - but the biggest difference in what

The US should, like the Netherlands, use auditable 
standards for wiretapping and misuse of it will tumble in 
one or to years to 0.1% or less of what now clearly 
happening.

Of course it's needed that people THINK about what can be 
done against misuse...

..

> chooses to do so having considered those effects, or having ignored

It seems to me that considering effects is just wise.

> discomfort,

Not at all, I think my "quest" to get more taps auditable 
is well worth the time it costs me. I definitely cannot 
afford to spend much more time but I'm quite happy with the 
results I booked here already.

> but I'm not going to apologize, nor stop. Surveillance is

Misuse of power is probably always a disgrace, misuse of 
democractic power even more.

(I don't think our moral standards and ideas stand that 
much apart. I do think I have thought somewhat beter about 
the problems and possible solutions.)

> the imminent failure of non-totalitarian-friendly vendors. 

You Americans keep mee puzzling about this "money is always 
right" issue.

A) The market doesn't know about this problem yet.

B) All participants have the same problem.

> Curiously enough, I was thinking the same about yours.

Well well!

+++chefren

---

From: Mark Atwood <[email-masked]>
Date: 22 Dec 1999 14:54:30 -0800

> the smart bombs they throw away at our costs...

Why Chefren, you are a US taxpayer? I never guessed.

Or who is NL bombing this week?

---

From: Martin Minow <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 16:07:28 -0800

> doesn't post, raise your hands ;-)
For the same reason that Concord was quiet whenever Thoreau was in
jail for anti-abolitionist rabble-rousing, perhaps?

[For the benefit of anyone unfamiliar with American history, Ralph
Waldo Emerson visited Thoreau in Concord jail and asked, "Henry, whatever
are you doing in here?" Thoreau replied, "Ralph, what are you doing
out there?]
 
Martin Minow
[email-masked]

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 01:04:39 +0100

> Or who is NL bombing this week?

If I remember well a few months ago my country paid about 
$50.000.000 for the bombing of Serbia, most probably to the 
US. To my dismay the money wasn't taken out of the defense 
budget but out of the "general" pot, without any discussion.

+++chefren

---

From: "Scott W Brim" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 20:07:38 -0500

The requirements are fairly clear.  We (the Internet) need technology 
which allows wiretapping.  We need technology which makes wiretapping 
impossible.  We need the ability for packets in a particular transaction 
to change modes as they cross jurisdictional boundaries.  ... It's a 
research issue.  Send it to the IRTF.

...Scott

---

From: Seth David Schoen <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 17:50:44 -0800

> jail for anti-abolitionist rabble-rousing, perhaps?

Shouldn't we refer to Thoreau's rabble-rousing as abolitionist?

	I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my
	government which is the slave's government also.

-- 
Seth David Schoen <[email-masked]>  | And do not say, I will study when I
Temp.  http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/  | have leisure; for perhaps you will
down:  http://www.loyalty.org/   (CAF)  | not have leisure.  -- Pirke Avot 2:5

---

From: Erik Huizer <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 09:18:36 +0100

Scott,

==> From: "Scott W Brim"

> research issue.  Send it to the IRTF.

Sodemieter nou toch op, ik hou niet van zwarte pieten. :-)

(in Dutch to fool wiretappers)

Erik Huizer
IRTF-chair

---

From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 13:46:29 -0800

>Concerning a): The IETF chairman suggested so.

I personally wish you would stop invoking my name/title. I suggested that
the question has to be understood and answered. If I had said "we must
write a specification for wiretap", then presumably this list would be
unnecessary in the first place.

>efficiently with the new laws there are standards needed.

This is a true statement, at least in the United States, as interpreted by
the FCC in its third ruling on CALEA. Vendors are threatened with fines if
they don't provide "packet mode intercept" by a certain date. The
interesting question is whether "packet mode intercept" applies to IP, or
whether it is limited to ATM etc. But certain standards are specified as
legal "safe harbors", notably TIA's specification. ACLU, the vendors, and
others are as we speak arguing that ruling, arguing that it should not
apply to IP telephony. Meanwhile, TIA, T1P1, and Packet Cable are
developing "safe harbor" intercept specifications.

Hence, from a US perspective, the question whether the IETF should develop
a "safe harbor" standard.

>Answered by individuals, not by IETF, and that's why this 

just exactly what do you think the IETF is composed of?

I'm not sure you're qualified to say what I think, or why this list is
still up. This list is still up because the discussion has not ended. 
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Fred Baker	| 519 Lado Drive
IETF Chair	| Santa Barbara California 93111
www.ietf.org	| Desk:   +1-408-526-4257
		| Mobile: +1-805-886-3873
		| FAX:	  +1-413-473-2403

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 1999 23:05:55 +0100

On 23 Dec 99, at 13:46, Fred Baker wrote:

> I personally wish you would stop invoking my name/title.

OK, sorry, to simple said.

> I suggested that

Of course.

+++chefren

---

From: Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1999 10:57:18 +0000

> a "safe harbor" standard.

What is a "safe harbor"?

Cheers,

Ben.

---

From: "Richard Payne" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Dec 1999 11:32:57 -0500

A "safe harbor" is a situation such that compliance with the law is assured,
although it may not be the only way to comply with the law. In this case, a
safe harbor would be a set of specs such that vendors and telco's complying
with the specs would not get charged with any offences under CALEA.

Richard Payne

---

From: Fred Baker <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 26 Dec 1999 12:40:41 -0800

>> a "safe harbor" standard.

As it was explained to me when I asked the same question...

If one is required to implement something under threat of sanctions, the
logical next question is "what do I implement which will protect me from
those sanctions". A standard specification which answers that is called a
"safe harbor standard".

You can read the TIA specification which the FCC's ruling specifies as a
"safe harbor" for packet mode telephony; it is at
ftp://ftpeng.cisco.com/fred/iesg, in a set of PDF files. This was mailed to
me by the chair of TIA.

---

From: "Richard Payne" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 07:55:05 -0500

Is this "safe harbor" being challenged by the TIA as going beyond the scope
of CALEA, and hence not really a safe harbor at all, or is it only being
challenged by the ACLU, the EFF, and EPIC?

Richard Payne

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 08:33:35 -0500

>challenged by the ACLU, the EFF, and EPIC?

An example of a "free speech" safe harbor: Do not speak. You are assured of 
being safe.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 1999 17:04:47 +0100

> An example of a "free speech" safe harbor: Do not speak. You are assured of 

<hm>

Don't you think you would become an easy to detect and 
highly suspected person if you don't speak?

Government puts billions in "health care" so I guess they 
can measure easily what's going on in your brain. They have 
laws they can misuse to put you in a house specially 
designed for "fools".

We should find ways to make that as costly as possible. I 
think we should take out the batteries, chips and speakers 
of Furbies and put them into our mouth so Governments can 
only get unuseful information from us.

We, the citizens, have to be alert! What do EPIC, EFF, 
ISOC, ABC, ZZZ and IETF think about it?

</hm>

+++chefren