Subject: Re: [Raven] Dutch wiretap abuse of power

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 1999 22:14:15 -0800

At 06:13 PM 11/30/99 , chefren wrote:
>On 30 Nov 99, at 17:15, Greg Broiles wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 01, 1999 at 01:50:02AM +0100, chefren wrote:
> > > The law of december 1998 has changed this all.
> >
> > Please explain how "The law of december 1998" has eliminated police
> > abuse of their authority. This is an exciting development indeed.
>
>They now have to allow tapping of their networks because
>the law allows law enforcement to do so (with proper
>warrants of course). There is a period in which no-fully-
>compliance is allowed. As far as I can estimate within
>about 7-12 months an auditable tapping standard will be
>chosen in The Netherlands.

What does this have to do with preventing police abuse? As far as I can 
tell, your "law of december 1998" only would appear to eliminate police 
abuse by legalizing what was one illegal. As far as I can tell, that's like 
suggesting that the way to eliminate murder is to legalize it. Modifying 
the law to conform to the antisocial behavior doesn't eliminate the 
antisocial quality of the behavior, just changes its legal status.

>The auditable part of it and the key's will prevent abuse
>for a very large part, if not 100%.

I understood your comments above to indicate that "the auditable part of it 
yet" isn't part of the law, so I don't see how the law can possibly 
eliminate abuse before it exists. Also, weren't you saying previously that 
it's the police themselves who write that law? Do you think that the police 
will do a good job of writing a law which prohibits their own misbehavior? 
I have a hard time drawing a principled distinction between that sort of 
self-regulation and the anarchy you seem so opposed to. I also find it 
difficult to understand how the police can write their own laws controlling 
their own behavior, but you insist that the laws have some sort of 
democratic basis.

If what you mean to say is "I hope that pretty soon they change the law so 
that taps require auditing", that's great, but please don't mislead us by 
confusing what the law says with what you hope it will say in the future. 
Perhaps you don't see a big difference between those two things, but other 
people do.

Further, this doesn't seem like a problem where there's any question about 
who was acting - it was clear who was acting, it was the NL police, and it 
was clear what they were doing, e.g., trying to intimidate XS4ALL into 
doing things not required by the law, but which the police considered 
convenient despite the lack of democratic mandate you're so fond of. If 
XS4ALL had been less familiar with the actual law or more easily 
intimidated, the police would apparently have been happy to break the law 
themselves, purportedly in pursuit of other lawbreakers. Doesn't that 
bother you?

It sounds to me like you need something like our 42 USC 1983 or 18 USC 242 
statutes, which provide for civil and criminal penalties for depriving 
people of their civil rights under color of law. Unfortunately, our 
statutes are only infrequently used successfully, but at least they're on 
the books.

>I still would be very happy to push an IETF standard...

.. but IETF standards will no more prevent police abuses than imaginary 
laws that you hope will be passed soon. I would be very happy to solve the 
police abuse (and military abuse, and intelligence agency abuse) problem, 
then talk about technology.

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PGP: 0x26E4488C

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---

From: "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 20:03:24 +1100

If I have understood any of this thread's debate so far, it is that evidence
of police abuse of power will be generated by technology complying to the
newer Dutch law - something the rest of us outside NL still don't have.

Regards,
Lyal
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]On Behalf Of
> Greg Broiles
> Sent: Wednesday, 1 December 1999 17:14
> To: chefren; [email-masked]
> Subject: Re: [Raven] Dutch wiretap abuse of power
>
>

---

From: Greg Broiles <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 01 Dec 1999 08:29:58 -0800

Well, that makes sense, although it's my understanding that the "newer 
Dutch law" is merely something that Chefren hopes will be enacted, and is 
apparently going to be written by the police themselves, so I'm reluctant 
to expect it to provide substantial oversight of the police or a 
significant impediment to tactics or practices they consider expedient.

However, I don't see how even Chefren's imaginary law would have changed 
the XS4ALL situation, where the police apparently bypassed the special 
central "tap-room" and went straight to an ISP, telling the ISP that they 
had the legal authority to require the ISP to provide access and assistance 
in making what was in fact an illegal wiretap. The police weren't hiding 
their identities nor the scope of the activity they were engaged in, there 
just hoped that XS4ALL would be impressed enough by their authority that 
they wouldn't ask any questions about the real legal foundations for the 
police behavior.

(I certainly don't want to give the impression that I think the NL police 
were acting different from other police in this situation - that's almost 
exactly what the FBI did here in the US a few days ago when they convinced 
the ISP to shut down the "crowdedtheater" site, by misrepresenting their 
legal authority and the status of their investigation to achieve a result 
they thought beneficial.)

In any event, this doesn't address the central problem, which is relying 
upon machines to understand and implement complicated legal reasoning in 
the face of determined efforts by their human operators to subvert their 
safeguards. I think the problem is essentially the same as the problem of 
copy protection of software - and other computer security problems where 
the creator of a software program tries to enforce particular rules based 
upon data about the physical world, where the software program must rely on 
hardware under the control of a hostile party in order to learn about the 
physical world. I don't have a formal proof to support my assertion, but I 
don't believe that goal is achievable. So far as I know, it hasn't been 
achieved yet, even in cases where the attackers' motivation or reward is 
much weaker than that in this case, and despite determined and well-funded 
efforts on the part of the defenders.

At 01:03 AM 12/1/99 , Lyal Collins wrote:
>Real-To:  "Lyal Collins" <[email-masked]>
>

--
Greg Broiles
[email-masked]
PGP: 0x26E4488C

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 23:43:52 +0100

On 30 Nov 99, at 22:14, Greg Broiles wrote:

> What does this have to do with preventing police abuse?

You stopped reading 2 lines early...

> As far as I can 
> eliminate abuse before it exists.

The law states "maatregelen van bestuur", more or less 
rules. Those rules state specific protocols. For GSM and 
ISDN tap there is a DES key system that works well.

> Also, weren't you saying previously that 
> it's the police themselves who write that law?

No. However they can ASK for laws and politics can give 
them.

..

> confusing what the law says with what you hope it will say in the future.

Law is in place, protocols for GSM and ISDN taps 
specifically state DES key's, protocols for IP taps aren't 
ready.

..

> doing things not required by the law, but which the police considered 

"it was clear", you only read documentation of Xs4all I presume???

..

+++chefren

=Signature follows=

I think we need a simple architecture for a point
to point tap interface that has strong provisions
against misuse.

On one side the communication provider who only
starts tapping a specific customer or IP number
with proper warrants.

On the other side the approved tapping room.

Everything should be organized by a central
"tapping office". This office should provide
keys for strong encryption to both communication
provider and tapping room.

Law and technology should both provide as
much checks and balances as we can come up
with. Law can provide good procedures,
technology can provide technical means to
check them or force them.

=Large signature ended. If you want to
help to setup a standard for the above
design, please contact me.=

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 23:45:54 +0100

On 1 Dec 99, at 20:03, Lyal Collins wrote:

> If I have understood any of this thread's debate so far, it is that
> evidence of police abuse of power will be generated by technology
> complying to the newer Dutch law - something the rest of us outside NL
> still don't have.

Exactly!

+++chefren

---

From: Christian Price <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Dec 1999 12:13:58 -0700

I think it is clear that there is a firm belief (supported by technical
evidence) that tcp/ip packets and headers can be forged and tamperd with
to a point which makes the utility of tcpdump and traffic analysis near
zero for the purposes of nonrepudiation, and logically prosecution. 
Additionally, if we are concerned about abuse of authority, what would
stop LE from using the unauditable tcpdump (or similar tool) to monitor
in general, and then turn on auditing when it was convenient.  The
figurative cat is out of the metaphorical bag - the tool already
exists.  This is much the same as scanning the cordless phone RF
spectrum near a suspect's house, and if good information is obtained
putting it down as an anonymous tip.  Anyway, cordless phones have a low
legal expectation of privacy.  Currently the internet has a legal
expectation of privacy similar to that of cordless phones - the analogy
to a crowded room is accurate.  Thus encryption is needed to raise the
expectation of privacy and provide nonrepudiation.  This makes the
possibility of knowing what is said lower and the ability to know who
said it greater.  Thus traffic analysis could be a useful LE tool w/o
needing (or being able) to read the messages.

I do not support any protocol which has been designed to allow access to
the cleartext of an encyphered datastream for the purposes or 'legal'
tapping.  The potential for abuse and introduction of hackability is too
high.

None the less, I like the idea of a tapping(?) utiltiy which self
audits.  It would hopefully produce more responsible use of the
tapping.  However the ability to interpret the information gained by a
LE tap (encrypted or not) has no historical backing in the free world
which I am aware of (and probably raises significant 5th amendment
concerns in the US).  However, the audited capture of packets for the
purposes of traffic analysis may be a good legal too.

The essential problem is that LE taps, and, with warrants has the
authority to do so.  So we cannot eliminate tapping.  Thus it is best to
work within the framework that taping occurs legally in free countries
and we should examine how best to facilitate it w/o giving up any more
privacy rights.

I guess I take the opinion that if it wasn't encrypted, it was said in
public for anyone to hear.  If it was said w/e2e encryption, then noone
except the intended recipient has the right to hear, and forcing key
disclosure is forcing self incrimination.  However the fact that the
communications occurred is freely observable, just as though you had
mailed a letter or made a phone call - the source and destination can be
determined by observation.

Of course it is possible that I am ignorant of a technology or technique
of hacking which makes my assumptions about traffic analyis and auditing
entirely false.

--Christian

ps - I work for an implementer/carrier but my views are my own.

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 1999 20:25:46 +0100

On 2 Dec 99, at 8:32, Ed Stone wrote:

> At 05:45 PM 12/1/1999 , you wrote:
> Parsing this, it says that if the NL police comply with the newer Dutch 
> law, they will provide evidence of police abuse of power.
> 
> Now if they are violating the law by abuse of police power, please describe 
> why you expect them to comply with the law regarding how they do taps. 
> Specifically, address the point of this illegal scenario:
> 
> 1. without any warrant or other legal justification, the police tap Joe.

How can they? They have no power over the communication 
provider that has to do the physical tapping. The 
communication provider may not put a tap on a communication 
channel without a warrant. The warrant is given by a third 
party, the prosecutor.

> 2. the tap overhears Joe talk with Fred.

Tapping policemen that get cought will get very serious 
problems.

> 3. Fred alludes to things that might be illegal.
> 4. The police who hear the tap order other police to stop Fred's car and 
> search it.

They may nog search the car without a good reason. "He 
looks criminal" isn't a good reason.

> 5. The police arrest Fred based on what they find in the search.

But cannot tell the judge why they searched? Serious 
problem.

> 6. The testimony in court does not disclose the source of interest in Fred, 
> or that he or Joe were ever tapped.

Impossible here. A tap is always administered. Key's are 
distributed to the tapping room that has no special 
interest with "recherche-teams" and the tapping centre of 
the communication provider.

> Result: illegal wiretap; search directed from fruits of the illegal 
> wiretap; illegal non-disclosure of initial wiretap; conviction, as the 
> ultimate fruit of an undisclosed illegal search, which could not be 
> contested in court, because it was kept secret from the defendant and the 
> court.

At least 2 serious nono's in what you assume. And if we put 
up an IETF standard with the proposed tapbox that sends 
checksums to usenet after some time it will appear that a 
box has sent checksums that weren't administered.

Yes they could have used "illegal" tcpdump's and decoding 
programs that work with such files but that would require a 
complete illegal police department.

+++chefren

=Signature follows=