Subject: [Raven] What's Needed... 2 try

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 04:02:08 +0100

------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
From:           	"chefren" <[email-masked]>
To:             	[email-masked]
Date sent:      	Wed, 22 Dec 1999 02:37:03 +0100
Priority:       	normal
Subject:        	[Raven] Raven, What's Needed...

OK friends, let's try to KISS:

= =

What law enforcement basically needs is a way to tap only 
communication for which they have a warrant.

IETF thinks that's an unavoidable need, one that has to be 
met in standards, and is interested in how this need can be 
fulfilled in a way that preserves as much citizen rights as 
possible.

= =

BASIC IDEAS:

As much personal IPv6 numbers as the citizen wants.

 Every citizen can get as many IPv6 numbers as she/he
 wants for a small fee each (everything that costs zero
 will be spoiled). The numbers are given out by a special
 IPv6-agency under strict control of very different
 organizations. For example Local Justice department,
 Local police department and IETF. (Digital form of the
 power splitting ideas of Montesqieu.) Without proper
 warrants the IPv6-agency will never relieve which numbers
 are given out to whom. The three or more parties of which
 the agency consists each have only a part of the data and
 need each other to fulfil a request to give law
 enforcement the IPv6 numbers of a specified citizen. 

 This system, which enables the citizens to have "as much
 identities as they want", is a means to give citizens as
 much privacy as possible, to look at porn sites she/he
 can use IPv6 numbers A,B and C, for work number D, for
 friends numbers E,F,G and H, for family number K et
 cetera. 

 Laws should be in place to prevent =any= IPv6 number
 logging/registration without both knowledge of the number
 owner and his/her agreement to store it. 

 The IPv6 numbers will be the car license plates the
 citizen needs to use while communicating via the
 Internet. 

New protocol for Routers

 Routers, under control of communication providers, should
 be equipped with a new IETF tapping protocol. Basically
 this protocol makes it possible to program IPv6 numbers
 and destination addresses. All data to and from the IPv6
 numbers that pass the router will be copied to the
 according destination addresses.  

 The destination address should be a sealed open-source
 tapbox that's fully under control of the communication
 provider. The box timestamps the data, makes checksums /
 hashes of the data and will crypt the data before it's
 sent to the tapping room of the law enforcement unit that
 handed the warrant for the tap.   

+++chefren

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---

From: "Thomas Junker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 29 Dec 1999 21:35:06 -0600

> communication for which they have a warrant.

What you think "law enforcement needs" is not particularly 
relevant here.

> IETF thinks that's an unavoidable need, 

That's odd... *we* are the IETF and *we* don't seem to 
think so.

> one that has to be 
> met in standards, 

Nonsense.  That's just plain false.

> and is interested in how this need can be 

Also nonsense.  You're putting words into the mouths of 
other people, as usual.

>  Local police department and IETF. (Digital form of the

You have gone off the deep end.  Not only are you actively 
advocating the gratuitous facilitation of wiretapping, not 
only are you ignoring the question posed to the IETF and 
the sole reason for this list to exist, you still persist 
in trying to convert this list into a forum for proposing 
specific wiretap mechanisms.

>  Without proper
>  are given out to whom. 

That's a legal issue which neither you nor the IETF will 
have any control over.

>  The three or more parties of which

That's a legal issue which neither you nor the IETF will 
have any control over.

>  identities as they want", 

Wrong.  IPv6 *without* state intervention of any kind will 
already provide virtually all the IP addresses anyone 
could want.  No one needs what you suggest, large numbers 
of people no doubt DON'T WANT what you suggest, and it is 
deceitful to try to tie what you suggest to the plentiful 
availability of IP numbers.

>  is a means to give citizens as
>  much privacy as possible, 

State-registered IP addresses and the controls on end-to-
end encryption you have suggested do nothing to give 
anyone privacy.  Besides, privacy is not something you or 
anyone can "give" anyone -- privacy is what results from 
being left *out* of registration and surveillance 
mechanisms and record-keeping.  Privacy is what results 
when people are free to do end to end encryption.

>  owner and his/her agreement to store it. 

That's a legal issue and beyond your control.  One might 
also say, "Laws should be in place to punish law 
enforcement personnel who capture data without a proper 
warrant."  Do the legislatures of the world listen to 
chefren?  I think not.  You might as well say, "No one 
should be hungry."  This has nothing to do with IETF.

>  citizen needs to use while communicating via the

To paraphrase some famous words, "We don' need no stinkin' 
license plates!"

>  provider. 

That's a legal issue and outside your control and outside 
the control of any standard.

>  The box timestamps the data, makes checksums /

Whether such would actually happen is outside your control 
and outside the control of any standards body.

More alarming than your obsession with promoting 
wiretapping, more alarming than your promoting in the 
wrong place, is the spectacle the IETF has allowed this 
list to become.

Regards,

Thomas Junker
[email-masked]

[this addendum is specifically for "chefren" messages, 
since he tries to take the list discussion far from its 
purpose]

NOTE:  The person calling himself "chefren" has virtually 
hijacked the Raven list by blitzing it with posts in which 
he repeatedly ignores reminders of the purpose of the list 
and suggests, directly and indirectly, that discussion of 
his "proposals" for "auditable wiretaps" are legitimate 
topics for discussion here.

This list was created by the IETF to entertain discussion 
of a specific policy question, phrased by the IESG as two 
questions:

    "Should the IETF develop new protocols or modify
    existing protocols to support mechanisms whose 
    primary purpose is to support wiretapping or other 
    law enforcement activities?" 

    and 

    "What should the IETF's position be on informational
    documents that explain how to perform message or
    data-stream interception without protocol 
    modifications?"

That's it!  The first and primary question requests a 
"Yes" or "No" answer, presumably with discussion of pros 
and cons with differing opionions, for the purpose of 
clarifying their positions and possibly convincing others.

The second question requests a similarly simple answer, 
presumably also to include supporting discussion.

Nowhere in the list's charter does it appear appropriate 
to use the list to shift the discussion to the hows and 
whys of wiretapping, or specific proposals for setting 
standards for wiretapping.  The question before the IETF 
is WHETHER OR NOT TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN SUCH MATTERS.

Appropriate discussion could certainly include specifics 
of the technical challenges faced by the vendors and 
carriers in meeting their legal obligations in various 
jurisdictions, as part of their case for IETF 
participation in setting standards for wiretapping.  It 
could certainly also include discussion of the technical 
and political reasons for IETF NOT to get involved in such 
matters.

Contrary to what chefren often writes, there is no 
"proposed auditable tap standard" in any IETF context.  
Such references are entirely in the imagination of 
chefren, who fails utterly to comprehend the purpose and 
nature of this list and the process for submission of 
proposed standards.  Unfortunately, many newcomers to the 
list and at least several reporters have concluded that 
the topic of the list is chefren's ravings.  The topic of 
the list is to answer the two questions quoted above that 
were posed by the IESG to the IETF.  Period.

The charter of the list may be found in its first message, 
available for viewing at:

    http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/working-
groups/raven/current/msg00000.html

The Web page for the Raven list and access to the list 
archive may be found at:

-----

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 15:38:24 +0100

> specific wiretap mechanisms.

I think there should be proposals to give good insights in 
what CAN be done and only good insights can lead to wise 
answers on the basic questions of the list.

..

> availability of IP numbers.

Respectable states want respectable taps, if you know 
another way to circumvent the underlying problem it's OK to 
me. Please state such ideas, they will make the discussion 
here more interesting.

> State-registered IP addresses

NO. I specifically didn't stated "State-registered", state 
may be one third or so of the registration office.

> and the controls on end-to-
> anyone privacy.

If you misread yes.

> Besides, privacy is not something you or 

People arent free to do so anymore, in respectable 
countries people may not crypt for other people, they have 
to decode it for law enforcement if they have a warrant.

Encryption -is- already regulated, your "free" isn't 
absolute already.

> That's a legal issue and beyond your control.

It's a proposal. 

> One might 
> warrant."

They are in place.

..
 
> To paraphrase some famous words, "We don' need no stinkin' 

Take them from the car where you drive in and see what 
happens.

Long time ago there were no license plates, unfortunately 
they have proven to be necessary.

Why shouldn't that be the same for Internet?

(Again, I'm not in for NRA type primitive discusions.)

> the control of any standard.

If the techies do a proposal as I did the lawmakers can 
adopt laws to it. In a free society it's nice that no one 
has control about everything.

> and outside the control of any standards body.

It's a proposal, a proposal to solve a problem. You propose 
nothing else than "leave the problem", not something I have 
much respect for.

> wrong place, is the spectacle the IETF has allowed this 

You shouldn't be so politic and subscribe to some EFF list.

..

> since he tries to take the list discussion far from its 

Please correct the wrong parts in it as I indicated some 
time ago.

I think the "no-sayers" hijack the list.

+++chefren

---

From: Ed Stone <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 10:30:47 -0500

At 01:47 PM 10/11/99 -0400, The IESG wrote: >
  "should the IETF develop new protocols or modify existing protocols  to 
support mechanisms whose primary purpose is to support wiretapping or other 
law enforcement activities"

Chefren wrote on 12/28/99 "Although I think it's at least a little 
misleading I have no problems with the exact phrase 'conclude that the 
answer from the preponderance of people posting here is "no"'."

Chefren wrote on 12/29/99 "Maybe it is better that everyone who doesn't 
want tapping standards just votes so, unsubscribes and let the others who 
don't know or want standards finally figure out what can be done."

Chefren, your comment of the 29th shows a terrible disrespect for the 
authority that chartered this discussion, and a rejection of the democratic 
process that came to a conclusion with which you disagree. Now you ask that 
the majority shut up and go away from this list, so those few who want to 
facilitate wiretapping may use this list to do so without distraction by 
the majority, while hijacking the imprimatur of the IETF. This is in the 
face of your admitting that the preponderant view here is that IETF should 
not create or modify protocols to facilitate wiretapping.

It is difficult to reconcile that view with your stated desire to serve 
democracy and to honor authority.

It appears to me that your primary interest is simply in serving the 
facilitation of further surveillance of individuals by governments, 
worldwide, and that you view the ends as justifying the means.

I urge you to return from your attempt to develop wiretap facilitation here 
in spite of the question framed and the expressed will of the majority, to 
the question before the list. Further, in doing so, your arguments will 
gain weight if you will provide citation of specific and conclusive law 
including reference to its applicability to IETF and nations worldwide, 
where law is your justification, and citation of documented market 
circumstance, where market demand is your justification.
--
--------------------------
Ed Stone
[email-masked]
--------------------------

---

From: "chefren" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 1999 22:02:36 +0100

> answer from the preponderance of people posting here is "no"'."

I could have added: And that majority doen't add much to 
the discussion.
 
> authority that chartered this discussion,

Why? I start thinking you want to find the truth by voting 
a way of finding the truth a certain Mr Leibnitz rejected a 
very long time ago.

> and a rejection of the democratic 
> process that came to a conclusion with which you disagree.

I have no problems with recognizing a majority but in this 
case it doesn't help the discussion much. We need to think 
further to find out if there are good chances behind the 
current horizon.

> Now you ask that 

The IETF may decide what they want, I think this list has 
to find and discuss as much arguments as we can find so the 
IETF can make a wiser choice.

> democracy and to honor authority.

My people/country has decided Internet should be tappable, 
I think it should be done as good as possible. That's not 
"as much as possible" but more or less as auditable as 
possible.

> worldwide, and that you view the ends as justifying the means.

You are plain wrong.

> I urge you to return from your attempt to develop wiretap facilitation here

I want to discuss what can be done and what are the 
problems with the proposals.

> circumstance, where market demand is your justification.

As far as I unerstood it it will not be this list who 
decides what IETF will do, we just have to come up with as 
much knowledge so a better decision can be expected.

+++chefren