Subject: Re: [RPSEC] Situation with BGP security reqs draft

From: Sandy Murphy <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 13:34:54 -0500 (EST)

>interactions with static routes

Hm.  Static routes.  Won't we have to include this for consideration
when we're talking about the "first AS" authorization?

That is, I imagine that section 9.4 (Originating BGP Routes - "injecting
routing information acquired by some other means") is supposed to
cover static routes, yes?

So forwarding interactions with static routes aren't controllable
by BGP and are so out of scope, but routing information interactiosn
with static routes are controllable by BGP and so are in scope?

--Sandy

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From: Alex Zinin <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2005 13:07:57 -0800

Sandy,

> by BGP and are so out of scope,

that's what I meant.

> but routing information interactiosn

this may become a slippery slope. one can come up with different types of
attacks using static routes (e.g. "ip route <bgp-next-hop>/32 null0"), which BGP
will have no control over. from the route origination perspective, static routes
are a source of routing info to inject.

Alex