Subject: Re: [RPSEC] comments on draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-03

From: [email-masked]
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2006 14:38:00 -0500 (EST)

>> It would be best if the bgp security requirements did not prevent
>> consideration of a solution that would be acceptable to some portions
>> of the Internet or to specific networks, either now or N years from now.
>
>Would you say it shouldn't favor solutions that can be deployed today, 
>however?

If we identify a feature as a security requirement and it turns out
that the only solution meeting that requirement is not deployable
everywhere then we have lots of options:
(1) deploy it where it can be deployed with consideration of what
    that means system wide
(2) institute immediate and urgent action on three fronts
    (a) a research into a solution
    (b) improvements to existing environment so it is deployable
    (c) research into new securable routing protocol

>you believe that security is primarily focused on making existing 
>specifications "secure," or about securing systems,

You can stipulate requirements for a protocol, then require that
any proposed solution must state how requirements that were not
met by the solution would be handled by other considerations -
like operational practices, for example.

I do not favor identifying requirements, looking at the difficulty
at meeting them, and throwing out requirements that cannot be
*CURRENTLY* met.  (A requirement for solving the halting problem
would therefore not be considered.)

>These are not orthogonal, they are complimentary. You don't get rid of 
>red because you have blue, you mix the two to make purple.

I did not say orthogonal, I said obviated.

One part of the doc says "not all routers have to participate"
and the other part says "the solution must not require X of
all routers".  Well, of course the solution won't require X of
all routers, because not all routers have to participate.
One part of the document makes the other statement unnecessary.

--Sandy

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From: Russ White <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2006 16:15:04 -0500

>     (c) research into new securable routing protocol

So, rather than doing what can be done, you'd rather set the 
requirements so they are "perfect," without any consideration for 
deployability, and then deploy nothing for several years, until the 
entire infrastructure of the Internet and all connected networks can be 
replaced? I consider this view a bit unrealistic.

Further, I consider the deployability part of the set of requirements 
that would make any such proposal "perfect." What you appear to be 
arguing for is to place a specific piece of the problem--"security 
requirements"--above the remainder of the requirements. I would actually 
boil this down to: "we should place securing BGP processing above 
actually securing the BGP component (or subsystem) of networks on which 
BGP runs."

I assume, from this line of argument, that IPsec is the most perfect 
system possible for protecting data transported in IP packets, and it's 
just a happy coincidence that it's actually deployable.... Somehow, I 
don't think anyone is going to tell me that IPsec was actually designed 
without regard to the impacts on the systems deploying it. :-)

> One part of the document makes the other statement unnecessary.

Then we should modify the part that says: "Don't require X of all 
routers," to: "don't require X of all routers on which the proposed 
solution is running."

:-)

Russ

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[email-masked] CCIE <>< Grace Alone