Subject: Re: [rrg] future routing architecture in view of stuxnet...

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2010 13:41:08 EDT

In einer eMail vom 28.09.2010 19:06:57 Westeuropäische Sommerzeit schreibt  
[email-masked]:

>  Tony, I take your remark as a pro and not as a con. The BGP concept   
> as of today is such that you cannot
> harm all by harming just  a special well confined subset thereof  
> (like e.g. the  ALT-routers).

There is box, GRE tunnel, and underlying physical  redundancy. If an  
ALT-router gets taken out, or simply crashes,  Map-Requests have  
alternate paths to  take.

Dino

This is not that cyber-ware scenario. Maybe I should start asking the  
question how many ALT-routers would be needed to match the current internet with 
 its 10 000 DFZ-routers. (The smaller the number, the more vulnerable.The 
bigger  the number the less effective, right?)
 
Imho when the entire internet's operation dpends on the well-functioning of 
 a small set of network elements (like the ALT-routers) then there is some  
potential danger due to the concept:
 
a) cyber-war:what if  this set of network elements is concurrently  
attacked ?
b) peace: what if this set of network elements is politically controlled by 
 one mighty authority?
          (for  comparison:  Note that Europe tries to launch Galileo 
although GPS works  pretty well)
 
Heiner