Subject: RE: [Seamoby] Topic #1: Dos Attack

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 16:24:48 -0500

Note that the same problem, an MN bombarding a router with packets, can occur
for dycard as well, so it is not exclusive to the server approach.

[Govind] Just a clarification, if you are talking about the increase in processing 
load on the AR to handle APid packets then you are right. This is a problem, not only with dycard but, with any  protocol that sends and receives packets and has the possibility of malicious
nodes. Even to selectively drop packets you need to look at the fields of the packet. 
I was talking about the other additional associated problems brought in by the unique handling
 of APid packets by the DT draft. Sorry if I was not clear in my earlier mail.  
_______________________________________________
Seamoby mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/seamoby

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 13:56:25 -0800

So whatever the protocol, there needs to be some definition of rate-limiting in
the standard, and instructions for the router to protect itself if the rate is
exceeded.

The DT draft currently doesn't have anything in on this.

This is an issue.

            jak

----- Original Message -----
From: <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Sent: Monday, March 10, 2003 1:24 PM
Subject: RE: [Seamoby] Topic #1: Dos Attack

> load on the AR to handle APid packets then you are right. This is a problem,
not only with dycard but, with any  protocol that sends and receives packets and
has the possibility of malicious

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 13:56:25 -0800

This is an issue.

            jak