Subject: [sidr] suggested text to replace Section 4 in the use cases doc

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 10:19:30 -0500

Randy,

here is my suggestion for text that is not so folksy and is clearer (at 
least to me).

Steve

4.Example Uses

Case 1:

ISP C find that its CA certificate has been be revoked (or modified to 
removed resources) by the RIR (or ISP) that issued it. ISP C believes 
that this revocation was either an error by RIR staff, or that the RIR 
has been compelled to revoke the certificate by a law enforcement agency 
in the jurisdiction where the RIR operates. ISP C would like other ISPs 
to be able to ignore the certificate revocation (or modification), at 
their discretion.

Case 1 also encompasses a larger case, e.g., when all of the ISPs with a 
country require protection for an RIR action of this sort, coordinated 
at a national level. We cannot assume that the country operates an NIR.

Case 2:

ISP B makes use of private address space (RFC 1918) or makes use of 
address space allocated to some other party , but which is not announced 
globally). ISP B makes use of the RPKI internally, as well as for global 
routing. ISP B would like its use of private address space to work 
internally with routers that make use of RPKI data.

Case 3:

An organization, A, is authorized to control routing of traffic from a 
set of ISPs to the rest of the Internet. (For example, A may want 
traffic to selected addresses to be redirected to other addresses, or be 
dropped.)Because these ISPs want to use the RPKI, A needs a way to 
coordinate their use of the RPKI (insupport of A's traffic management 
goal).

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From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 15:20:55 +0000

wow!  text.  i will incorporate after a pause for list denizens to
comment.  thanks!

randy

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From: Di Ma <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 15:54:12 +0000

Steve,
	It’s  more explicit and better to understand. 

	But I suggest eliminating the expression concerning NIR that is  “Case 1 also encompasses a larger case, e.g., when all of the ISPs with a country require protection for an RIR action of this sort, coordinated at a national level. We cannot assume that the country operates an NIR."

	INR management in a country with NIR  could be very complicated, with different operation models.  If necessay , a separate operation doc might be presented, getting NIR stuff involved.

Di Ma
Internet Domain Name System Beijing Engineering Research Centre (ZDNS)
KNET Technologies

在 2014年3月4日，下午3:19，Stephen Kent <[email-masked]> 写道：

> Randy,
> 
> here is my suggestion for text that is not so folksy and is clearer (at least to me).
> 
> Steve
> 
> 4.  Example Uses
>  
> Case 1:
> ISP C find that its CA certificate has been be revoked (or modified to removed resources) by the RIR (or ISP) that issued it. ISP C believes that this revocation was either an error by RIR staff, or that the RIR has been compelled to revoke the certificate by a law enforcement agency in the jurisdiction where the RIR operates. ISP C would like other ISPs to be able to ignore the certificate revocation (or modification), at their discretion.
>  
> Case 1 also encompasses a larger case, e.g., when all of the ISPs with a country require protection for an RIR action of this sort, coordinated at a national level. We cannot assume that the country operates an NIR.
>  
> Case 2:
> ISP B makes use of private address space (RFC 1918) or makes use of address space allocated to some other party , but which is not announced globally). ISP B makes use of the RPKI internally, as well as for global routing. ISP B would like its use of private address space to work internally with routers that make use of RPKI data.
>  
> Case 3:
> An organization, A, is authorized to control routing of traffic from a set of ISPs to the rest of the Internet. (For example, A may want traffic to selected addresses to be redirected to other addresses, or be dropped.)  Because these ISPs want to use the RPKI, A needs a way to coordinate their use of the RPKI (in  support of A’s traffic management goal).
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

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From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2014 08:04:26 -0500

> Internet Domain Name System Beijing Engineering Research Centre (ZDNS)

Thanks for the feedback.

My point, in case 1, is that we cannot assume that a solution to this
use case can rely on the
existence of an NIR.

That is compatible with your observation that an NIR might need to
develop its own operations document.

Steve

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From: Di Ma <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2014 21:07:03 +0000

Agreed:)