Subject: Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-03.txt

From: "George, Wes" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 11:25:37 -0400

One question that comes up when reading this document. Now that we've
removed the dependency between Origin Validation and Path Validation but
are expecting them to run in parallel with some shared components, do we
need to discuss how BGPSec cert rollover interacts with Origin Validation
cert rollover, possibly giving hints to what a combined rollover process
looks like? Are we expecting that they should be done at the same time, or
that they should NOT be done at the same time, or does it just not matter?
For example, if it's better to have the rolls done separately, then
probably some guidance about the expiry times not lining up might be good.
It's conceivable that if you're doing an emergency roll on account of
compromised keys, you might be doing both at once, regardless of whether
it's a good idea normally, so I think we need to highlight any gotchas
that may be present. Maybe this belongs in the ops doc?

Thanks,

Wes

On 3/6/15, 7:43 PM, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
wrote:

>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working
>Group of the IETF.
>
>        Title           : BGPSEC Router Certificate Rollover
>        Authors         : Roque Gagliano
>                          Keyur Patel
>                          Brian Weis
>       Filename        : draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-03.txt
>       Pages           : 15
>       Date            : 2015-03-06
>
>Abstract:
>   BGPSEC will need to address the impact from regular and emergency
>   rollover processes for the BGPSEC End-Entity (EE) certificates that
>   will be performed by Certificate Authorities (CAs) participating at
>   the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  Rollovers of BGPSEC
>   EE certificates must be carefully managed in order to synchronize
>   distribution of router public keys and the usage of those pubic keys
>   by BGPSEC routers.  This document provides general recommendations
>   for that process, as well as describing reasons why the rollover of
>   BGPSEC EE certificates might be necssary.
>
>
>The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover/
>
>There's also a htmlized version available at:
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-03
>
>A diff from the previous version is available at:
>http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-03
>
>
>Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>submission
>until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 09:30:30 -0700

> that may be present. Maybe this belongs in the ops doc?

the enumeration of all tuples which do not interact may be dauntingly
large

randy