Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcp-auth-opt issue: reserved keyID value

From: Ron Bonica <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 04 Aug 2008 13:38:48 -0400

Folks,

I am against reserving the value 0. If we don't reserve 0, we only need 
one bit for the TSPI. Otherwise, we need two bits.

                                  Ron

Joe Touch wrote:
> Ran suggested that some implementations would benefit from reserving a
> keyID as invalid (e.g., keyID 0):
> 
> This assists the efficiency of some implementations.
> 
> This also adds an additional requirement (e.g., keyID 0 MUST not be
> used) which must be validated during conformance testing.
> 
> Comments on additional pros and cons would be useful. Examples of how
> this might impact implementation efficiency would be particularly useful
> (esp. if not encumbered)
> 
> 
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