Subject: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 08:30:01 -0700 (PDT)

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks
	Author(s)       : A. Ramaiah, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
	Pages           : 26
	Date            : 2009-09-14

TCP has historically been considered protected against spoofed off-
path packet injection attacks by relying on the fact that it is
difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source and destination IP
addresses and the source and destination ports) in combination with
the 32 bit sequence number(s).  A combination of increasing window
sizes and applications using longer term connections (e.g.  H-323 or
Border Gateway Protocol [RFC4271]) have left modern TCP
implementations more vulnerable to these types of spoofed packet
injection attacks.

Many of these long term TCP applications tend to have predictable IP
addresses and ports which makes it far easier for the 4-tuple
(4-tuple is the same as the socket pair mentioned in [RFC0793]) to be
guessed.  Having guessed the 4-tuple correctly, an attacker can
inject a TCP segment with the RST bit set, the SYN bit set or data
into a TCP connection by systematically guessing the sequence number
of the spoofed segment to be in the current receive window.  This can
cause the connection to abort or cause data corruption.  This
document specifies small modifications to the way TCP handles inbound
segments that can reduce the chances of a successful attack.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

---

From: "Anantha Ramaiah (ananth)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 08:49:30 -0700

This basically has :

The agreed upon Last Call comments incorporated.

   I have checked all the comments received and have incorporated the
ones which are agreed upon. Briefly :
 - new template
- No IPR disclsoures on IETF documents, the RFC editor would do what is
needed. Brian clarified this.
- Addressed the last call comments by Brian Carpenter.
- Fernando's Last call comments agreed upon (added references to RFC
1948 and port randomization). 
- Sandra Murphy's comments whichever has been agreed upon.
- misc (typos etc.,)

Thanks,
Anantha

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On 
> Behalf Of [email-masked]
> Sent: Monday, September 14, 2009 8:30 AM
> To: [email-masked]
> Cc: [email-masked]
> Subject: [tcpm] I-D Action:draft-ietf-tcpm-tcpsecure-12.txt
> 
> TCP has historically been considered protected against 
> spoofed off- path packet injection attacks by relying on the 
> fact that it is difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source 
> and destination IP addresses and the source and destination 
> ports) in combination with the 32 bit sequence number(s).  A 
> combination of increasing window sizes and applications using 
> longer term connections (e.g.  H-323 or Border Gateway 
> Protocol [RFC4271]) have left modern TCP implementations more 
> vulnerable to these types of spoofed packet injection attacks.
> 
> Many of these long term TCP applications tend to have 
> predictable IP addresses and ports which makes it far easier 
> for the 4-tuple (4-tuple is the same as the socket pair 
> mentioned in [RFC0793]) to be guessed.  Having guessed the 
> 4-tuple correctly, an attacker can inject a TCP segment with 
> the RST bit set, the SYN bit set or data into a TCP 
> connection by systematically guessing the sequence number of 
> the spoofed segment to be in the current receive window.  
> This can cause the connection to abort or cause data 
> corruption.  This document specifies small modifications to 
> the way TCP handles inbound segments that can reduce the 
> chances of a successful attack.
> 
> Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail 
> reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII 
> version of the Internet-Draft.
>