Subject: [tcpm] tcp-security: More feedback requested for the document outline

From: Fernando Gont <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2009 02:59:46 -0300

Folks,

The original deadline for commenting on the document outline is over.
These are the comments so far:

* Joe: wants to change the outline from the current outline (which
basically analyzes TCP on a "per-protocol-field",
"per-protocol-mechanism" basis, etc.) to an outline that basically
analyzes TCP on a "per-attack" basis (his proposal is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tcpm/current/msg04838.html)

* Wesley: would like to change the outline as proposed by Joe, but could
live without doing that.

* Alfred: wants to leave the outline as is

* Fernando: wants to leave the outline as is

* Toby: wants to change the outline as proposed by Joe

I don't personally see clear consensus for changing the outline (even
less if we consider that many more people had agreed to accept the
document "as is").

However, as there have not been that many opinions about the outline, I
think it would be a good idea if wg participants that have not yet
voiced their opinion regarding the document outline have another chance
to do it.

So let's set a new deadline for this second round off-comments: if you
have any comments regarding the document outline, please voice your
opinion till September 16th (Wednesday), 2009.

Thanks!

Kind regards,
-- 
Fernando Gont
e-mail: [email-masked] || [email-masked]
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1

---

From: Joe Touch <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2009 23:17:53 -0700

> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tcpm/current/msg04838.html)

The outline I proposed breaks things down into groups based on:
	
	control plane in-band
	control plane out-of-band
	data plane
	API

This is (loosely) based on how TCP is specified (order not withstanding).

Although I did suggest talking about attacks first, then talking about
mitigations (to separate the two, because a single attack can have
multiple mitigations, and a single mitigation can inhibit multiple
attacks), the overall structure is not per-attack as much as it based on
breaking the protocol down into its component parts.

- ---

It also distinguishes between protocol weaknesses (places where the
protocol creates a vulnerability, regardless of implementation - e.g.,
ICMP attacks), implementation choice issues (places where a choice left
to implementers can cause problems if poorly chosen - e.g., how some
SHOULDs turn into "don't do this in a secure implementation"), and
implementation vulnerabilities (implementation issues not related to
choices in the spec that create problems - e.g., searching the TIME-WAIT
list linearly).

Regardless of how we proceed, I believe that this latter issue should be
considered in the presentation of solutions.

---

From: Fernando Gont <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2009 04:27:47 -0300

Hi, Joe,

> considered in the presentation of solutions.

Yes. I think somebody else (David Borman?) already raised this issue.

As we start discussing the technical stuff, I will make sure it is clear
whether it's a protocol issue, an implementation issue, etc., whether
the specs mandate the behavior as a MUST, SHOULD (or whatever), and
whether the countermeasures comply with the specs or go against them.

Thanks!

Kind regards,

---

From: Lars Eggert <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2009 10:35:03 +0300

> opinion till September 16th (Wednesday), 2009.

Since you asked: As an individual, I have a preference for Joe's  
proposed outline. It's not a very strong one, however.

Lars

---

From: "Smith, Donald" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2009 13:55:04 -0600

I think since this is primarily for developers the current outline is slightly better then Joe's suggested outline.

(coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
[email-masked] gcia   

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On 
> Behalf Of Joe Touch
> Sent: Wednesday, September 09, 2009 12:18 AM
> To: Fernando Gont
> Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]
> Subject: Re: [tcpm] tcp-security: More feedback requested for 
> the documentoutline
> 
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> 
> Fernando Gont wrote:
> > Folks,
> > 
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