Subject: [TLS] Review of draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00

From: Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2008 09:53:20 -0800

$Id: draft-kato-tls-rfc4132bis-00-rev.txt,v 1.1 2008/03/04 17:32:45 ekr Exp $

It's not clear to me why this document isn't simply an updated
cut-and-paste of RFC 4132 with additional ciphers. In particular,
this draft contains a large number of grammatical errors which
have already been ironed out of 4132.

It's not clear to me that we really need the combinatoric
explosion of all possible key exchange and signature
algorithms with Camellia.

I think it's a bad idea to specify HMAC-SHA-1 for use with
the SHA-1 cipher suites. Note that all the suites in
TLS 1.2 use SHA-256.

Why do we need a mandatory to implement Camellia cipher
suite? TLS is quite capable of negotiating this stuff.

-Ekr
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From: KATO Akihiro <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2008 16:40:41 +0900

Eric,

Thank you for reviewing and comments.

> have already been ironed out of 4132.
Sure, quality of this version of our draft is low. I-D repository
version will get through more internal review.

> algorithms with Camellia.
Cipher suites combined CTR mode will remove. But one-side of Cipher
suite combined SHA-384 or SHA-512 will remain.

> TLS 1.2 use SHA-256
I found this description for PRF. I'm going to change MAC section as
following;

          Indicator of
          Cipher Suite         MAC             PRF

          SHA                  HMAC-SHA-1      P_SHA-256
          SHA256               HMAC-SHA-256    P_SHA-256
          SHA384               HMAC-SHA-384    P_SHA-256
          SHA512               HMAC-SHA-512    P_SHA-256

> suite? TLS is quite capable of negotiating this stuff.
"Mandatory Cipher Suite" section will remove.

-- 
- KATO Akihiro
  + NTT Software Corporation