Subject: Re: [TLS] EXTERNAL: TLS 1.3 Authentication and Integrity only Cipher Suites

From: Bill Frantz <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 09:55:28 -0500

On 2/11/21 at 9:01 PM, rsalz=[email-masked] (Salz, 
Rich) wrote:

>>I would just like to recognize that there are some situations where it isn't needed.
>
>Can you explain why TLS 1.2 isn't good enough for your needs?

In my experience, there are many attacks that aren't anticipated 
by the designers, but are successful. How can anyone know that 
you don't need privacy?

Back in the dark ages, I was working with a protocol which 
provided the same basic assurances as TLS does: confidentiality, 
authentication, and integrity. It and TlS also provide some 
other important assurances, such a one-time, in order delivery, 
which we also depended on. When we looked at a similar protocol 
which didn't provide confidentiality, we discovered that there 
was application level data that needed to be kept secret or the 
application's assurances would be violated.

In all honesty, it's probably cheaper to just provide 
confidentiality than it is to do the analysis and protocol 
proofs to show you don't need it.

Cheers - Bill

--------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | There are now so many exceptions to the
408-348-7900       | Fourth Amendment that it operates only by
www.pwpconsult.com | accident.  -  William Hugh Murray

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From: Ira McDonald <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 10:45:36 -0500

Hi,

I agree with Bill.  Keeping confidentiality in all TLS/1.3 connections is
future proofing.
Supposedly analyzing and then leaving confidentiality out invites future
attacks.

Cheers,
- Ira

On Thu, Feb 11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Bill Frantz <[email-masked]> wrote:

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