Subject: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-ctls-03.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 09:55:10 -0700

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Compact TLS 1.3
        Authors         : Eric Rescorla
                          Richard Barnes
                          Hannes Tschofenig
	Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-ctls-03.txt
	Pages           : 17
	Date            : 2021-07-12

Abstract:
   This document specifies a "compact" version of TLS 1.3.  It is
   isomorphic to TLS 1.3 but saves space by trimming obsolete material,
   tighter encoding, and a template-based specialization technique. cTLS
   is not directly interoperable with TLS 1.3, but it should eventually
   be possible for a cTLS/TLS 1.3 server to exist and successfully
   interoperate.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-ctls-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-ctls-03

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

---

From: Ben Schwartz <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 12:38:51 -0400

Feature request for cTLS: NAT Slipstream defense.

In the NAT Slipstream attack [1], the server causes the client to emit TCP
data that confuses a middlebox.  This attack is possible because, in
insecure HTTP, the server can largely control the TCP contents of
client->server communication (after the first packet).  Unfortunately, TLS
also allows server control of some portions of client output (e.g. session
tickets in resumption handshakes), so these attacks are also likely
possible with TLS.

cTLS could easily close this category of vulnerabilities, with zero size
overhead, by using the Random to randomize the remainder of the ClientHello
(or ServerHello).  There are many ways to enable this; e.g. XOR with the
output of HKDF-Expand-Label, with a "Secret" provided in the cTLS profile,
Label="ctls ch" or "ctls sh", and Context=Random.

[1] https://samy.pl/slipstream/

On Mon, Jul 12, 2021 at 12:55 PM <[email-masked]> wrote:

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