Subject: [Tm-rid] Proposed WG Charter

From: Robert Moskowitz <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 14:35:25 +0800

This is the beginning of the Charter.  As mentioned in the BOF, it needs:

Liaisoning with other SDOs (I have started this).

Clarity of work in other areas like RDAP.

So please read and comment and best provide clarifying text!

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Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification (TM-RID) Proposed WG Charter

Governmental agencies worldwide, including the United States Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), are embarking on rule making processes to 
define Remote Identification (RID) requirements for Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS).  ASTM International (formerly the American Society for 
Testing and Materials) F38 Committee Work Item WK65041, “Standard 
Specification for UAS Remote ID and Tracking”, addresses such 
anticipated requirements.  Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for 
UAS to send one-way over Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11.  Network RID defines 
how the same information (and potentially more) can be made available 
via the Internet.  The ASTM draft does not address how to ensure or at 
least assess trustworthiness of information communicated via RID.

TM-RID will build upon the Host Identity Tag (HIT) from the Host 
Identity Protocol (HIP) as an RID and augment it and supporting HIP and 
other IETF technologies to add trustworthiness to the ASTM messaging 
suite.  The goal is to provide trustworthiness both in an Internet 
connected environment and emergency, unconnected situations within the 
highly constrained environment of UAS.

The Host Identity Tag (HIT) is ideally, in fact uniquely, suited to work 
within this RID effort.  The Host Identity (HI) behind the HIT can be 
used to sign Broadcast Authentication Messages, thus proving ownership 
of the RID (HIT) and signed messages.  HITs provide significantly 
superior privacy compared to other allowed RID types while providing 
greater assurance to authorized observers that they are accessing the 
proper PII for the UA.

TM-RID will create specifications for HIP-augmented ASTM RID messages.  
Initially this will consist of additional RID Authentication Messages 
that use the HI in public key signing operations: to prove UAS ownership 
of a Hierarchical HIT (HHIT); to authenticate other claims made via RID, 
such as position and velocity, as having been made by the owner of that 
HHIT; and to provide observers lacking current Internet connectivity 
with locally verifiable UAS proof-of-registration objects.

For this, HIP would be amended to be used effectively in this environment:

- Hierarchical HITs (HHIT) enabling scalable and trustable UA 
registration and information retrieval:  HHIT was part of the original 
design of HIP, but was dropped for lack of a clear use case.  RID 
messages containing HHITs will enable use of DNS and potentially RDAP to 
access information about the UAS.

- expanded HIP Registration for HHITs:  This registration process will 
provide proof of authenticity and prevent duplicate HHITs from 
occurring.  Further, these Registries will provide the UAS DNS 
information and other services (e.g. RDAP and support of RVS for Network 
RID and related applications).

- new cryptographic algorithms: Extremely compact keys and signatures 
(such as are enabled by EdDSA and Keccak functions) are needed to meet 
the severely constrained UAS environment.

Further work will emerge as experience is gained in using HIP for UAS 
RID.  For example, some UAS Traffic Management (UTM) systems envision 
using OAuth for Ground Control Systems (GCS) and authorized safety 
personnel.  HIP as an OAuth method may help in merging HIP into these 
systems.

The workgroup will need to liaison with the various SDOs working in the 
UAS regulation space.

The goal is to complete these updates to HIP and publish the TMRID RFCs 
by the end of 2020.

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From: Robert Moskowitz <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 16:28:19 -0500

I have expanded the end of the charter.  Don't think I have it yet.

There is PKI buried in here.  The ICAO seems to expect everything to 
work via certs, and for parts of the environment that does make sense.  
Bootstrapping the PKI via HHITs could be a way to meet in the middle, so 
to speak.  I have this in part in the current Registry draft, but it is 
not yet clear in the charter.  Plus this is TMRID, and I am dipping into 
aspects of USS here.  Where does the workgroup stop?

Anyway, comments and writing help!

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Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification (TM-RID) Proposed WG

HHITs are envisioned to identify all components in the UAS/UTM (UAS 
Traffic Management) environment: UA, Command Consoles, Observer devices, 
and Registries.  This will entail further work as experience is gained 
in using HIP for UAS RID.  For example, some (UTM) systems envision 
using OAuth for Ground Control Systems (GCS) and authorized safety 
personnel.  HIP as an OAuth method may help in merging HIP into these 
systems.