Subject: [Tm-rid] demonstrations/tests of DRIP products

From: "Stuart W. Card" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 12:51:41 -0400

all --

I have had to take 3 weeks away from protocol standards work to specify
the requirements of an indoor facility in which we can fly UAS swarms,
_inter alia_ to test DRIP products. That is now done (except for needing
to defend it against people who want to do technically silly things).

I solicit your opinions on the following list of putative DRIP products
and sketch of simple demonstration scenarios.

DRIP products --
ASTM F3411-19 Broadcast RID implementation (baseline for comparison):
 UA XMTR,
 observer RCVR
ASTM F3411-19 Network RID implementation (baseline for comparison):
 UAS sender,
 Service Provider (USS),
 Display Provider (USS),
 client
DRIP Broadcast RID:
 IETF WG drafts complementing ASTM Broadcast RID standards,
 correspondingly enhanced prototype software
DRIP Network RID:
 IETF WG drafts complementing ASTM Network RID standards,
 correspondingly enhanced prototype software
CS-RID location confirmation:
 UA XMTR,
 finder Broadcast RCVR,
 finder Network sender,
 SDSP (ultimately multilateration, initially just sanity check),
 client
HIP tunnel observer-to-pilot secure comms:
 observer HIP Initiator,
 policy enforcing HIP RVS proxy,
 pilot HIP Responder

roles & relationships --
Alice: UAS operator w/baseline ASTM F3411-19 only
Bob: UAS operator w/DRIP-enhanced F3411
Carol: malicious operator (of fake and/or real UAS) & observer
Doug: privileged (e.g. public safety, air defense) observer w/DRIP
Eve: non-privileged observer (public citizen or eavesdropper)
Felix, Fernando, Floyd, Frank: CS-RID "finders"
Bob is in registry of operators trusted per Doug's organization's policy

demo steps --
0: Alice & Bob observed by any/all over broadcast & network (baseline)
1: Carol spoofs being Alice, but w/F3411-19, no one can discriminate
2: Carol attempts to spoof being Bob, anyone w/DRIP can discriminate
(inc. Doug)
3: Carol flies & transmits false locations, CS-RID alerts subscribers
4: Alice's GCS location received by any/all over broadcast [& network]
5: Bob's DRIP-encrypted GCS location decrypted only by/for Doug
6: Alice flies into newly restricted volume, little Doug can do
7: Bob flies into restricted volume, Doug trusts DRIP-verified Bob
8: volume restrictions tighten, via HIP tunnel Doug asks Bob to exit

Note I have not included demonstrations of any of the lookups, from the
received UAS IDs, in registries, of public or private information.
That's because it would complicate the demos beyond the attention span
of likely viewers. For our own DRIP [interoperability of independent
implementations] tests, we will also need to include all the
interactions with registries (as proposed, via DNS, RDAP, etc.). So if
anyone wants to take a stab at outlining those registry tests/demos
(initially at a high level as above), please do!

-- 
-----------------------------------------
Stuart W. Card, PhD, Principal Engineer
AX Enterprize, LLC  www.axenterprize.com
4947 Commercial Drive, Yorkville NY 13495