Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #4 (rfc6962-bis): Should we sign TBS for Certificates?

From: "trans issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2015 11:11:42 -0000

#4: Should we sign TBS for Certificates?

Comment (by [email-masked]):

 IIRC Rob Stradling suggested this is a good idea to avoid the issue of
 logs being susceptible to spamming by varying the signature algorithm
 specifier in the signature part of the X.509 certificate (so it does not
 match the one in the TBSCertificate part).

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 Reporter:  [email-masked]  |       Owner:  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect            |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major             |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
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Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/4#comment:1>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

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From: "trans issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2015 14:32:34 -0000

Comment (by [email-masked]):

 Yes.  There are an unlimited number of ways that a spammer could
 incorrectly re-encode the signature algorithm parameters in the signature
 part of a single certificate, so I think we definitely need to address
 this.
 We could address it by saying that logs MUST check that the signature
 parameters are encoded identically in a cert's signature part and
 TBSCertificate part, but I think this ticket's suggestion (to always sign
 TBS) is the more elegant solution.

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/4#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>