Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #55 (rfc6962-bis): Security Considerations: Describe the implications of clients *not* doing certain optional checks

From: "trans issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 17:53:51 -0000

#55: Security Considerations: Describe the implications of clients *not* doing
certain optional checks

Changes (by [email-masked]):

 * milestone:   => review

Comment:

 I presume this should become part of the threat analysis I-D.

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 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
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     Type:  defect       |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
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Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/55#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

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From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 10:02:52 -0800

Thought this one should be run past the working group: should
a description of the implications of clients not doing certain
optional checks be moved to the threat analysis draft?

Melinda

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [Trans] [trans] #55 (rfc6962-bis): Security Considerations:
Describe the implications of clients *not* doing certain optional checks
Resent-Date: Mon,  8 Jun 2015 10:53:51 -0700 (PDT)
Resent-From: [email-masked]
Resent-To: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 17:53:51 -0000
From: trans issue tracker <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked], [email-masked],
[email-masked]
CC: [email-masked]

#55: Security Considerations: Describe the implications of clients *not*
doing
certain optional checks

 * milestone:   => review

Comment:

_______________________________________________
Trans mailing list
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans

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From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 14:57:01 -0400

yes, this is/will be covered in the threat analysis.

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From: "trans issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 19:16:54 -0000

Changes (by [email-masked]):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed

-- 
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  [email-masked]       |  [email-masked]
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:  review
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/55#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

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From: Rob Stradling <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 20:20:31 +0100

Future implementers will read the 6962-bis RFC.  How do we ensure that 
these implementers are made aware that the 6962-bis Security 
Considerations don't give the full picture (of how to build a secure CT 
ecosystem)?

I suggest that the 6962-bis Security Considerations should reference the 
threat analysis I-D.

-- 
Rob Stradling
Senior Research & Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online

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From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 11:28:53 -0800

> I suggest that the 6962-bis Security Considerations should reference the

It would need to in any event, I believe.

Melinda

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From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 15:49:04 -0400

WFM.

> Considerations don't give the full picture (of how to build a secure 
> CT ecosystem)?
>
> I suggest that the 6962-bis Security Considerations should reference 
> the threat analysis I-D.
>

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2015 16:01:18 -0400

> optional checks be moved to the threat analysis draft?

Yes, i think it belongs in the threat analysis, so that we can keep
mechanism separate from more in-depth analysis.

The analysis might also be more nuanced than piecemeal implications on a
per-client basis: this is a sort of "herd immunity" situation, there are
may be ways that the system breaks down when only some fraction of
participants behave in certain ways.  I don't know how to characterize
this sort of tradeoff explicitly, but perhaps some of the folks modeling
CT behavior can contribute details?  They would certainly be good for us
to understand.

This analysis is important, but it might be too complex to overload
6962bis with, if we want 6962bis to be an effective implementer's
reference.  putting it in the threat-analysis draft would let us treat
the topic in more depth, if anyone has research worth sharing with the
community.

    --dkg