Subject: [xmpp] Fwd: I-D Action: draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-03.txt

From: Peter Saint-Andre <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 13:25:07 -0700

FYI.

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: I-D Action: draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-03.txt
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 12:23:38 -0800
From: [email-masked]
Reply-To: [email-masked]
To: [email-masked]

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.

	Title           : Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
	Author(s)       : Peter Saint-Andre
	Filename        : draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-03.txt
	Pages           : 10
	Date            : 2013-12-17

Abstract:
   This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
   (XMPP).  This document updates RFC 6120.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-saintandre-xmpp-tls-03

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

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---

From: Dave Cridland <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 18:09:01 +0000

Some scattergun comments.

1) I think you're saying SHOULD support, MAY negotiate TLS 1.1. Are you?
Are we also saying SHOULD support later TLS versions, and SHOULD negotiate
them?

2) There was some interesting discussions on the use of long-lived DH
parameters and the resultant levels of perfection in the forward secrecy
over on (erm) one of the XSF lists. It'd be nice to get some
recommendations of longevity of the DH parameters - many implementations
either hard-code these or generate them once only.

On Tue, Dec 17, 2013 at 8:25 PM, Peter Saint-Andre <[email-masked]>wrote:

> xmpp mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xmpp
>