Subject: [xmpp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-00.txt

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2014 12:18:24 -0800

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH)
        Authors         : Matthew Miller
                          Peter Saint-Andre
	Filename        : draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-00.txt
	Pages           : 16
	Date            : 2014-02-04

Abstract:
   Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to deploy proper
   PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted environments, since
   certification authorities will not issue certificates for hosted
   domains to hosting services, hosted domains do not want hosting
   services to hold their private keys, and hosting services wish to
   avoid liability for holding those keys.  As a result, domains hosted
   in multi-tenanted environments often deploy non-HTTP applications
   such as email and instant messaging using certificates that identify
   the hosting service, not the hosted domain.  Such deployments force
   end users and peer services to accept a certificate with an improper
   identifier, resulting in obvious security implications.  This
   document defines two methods that make it easier to deploy
   certificates for proper server identity checking in non-HTTP
   application protocols.  The first method enables the TLS client
   associated with a user agent or peer application server to obtain the
   end-entity certificate of a hosted domain over secure HTTP as an
   alternative to standard PKIX techniques.  The second method enables a
   hosted domain to securely delegate a non-HTTP application to a
   hosting service using redirects provided by HTTPS itself or by a
   pointer in a file served over HTTPS at the hosted domain.  While this
   approach is developed for use in the Extensible Messaging and
   Presence Protocol (XMPP) as a Domain Name Association prooftype, it
   can be applied to any non-HTTP application protocol.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-xmpp-posh/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-00

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

---

From: Matt Miller <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2014 13:25:10 -0700

This is draft-miller-posh-03 with the authors and references updated.

- -- 
- - m&m

Matt Miller < [email-masked] >
Cisco Systems, Inc.

On 2/4/14, 1:18 PM, [email-masked] wrote:
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories. This draft is a work item of the Extensible Messaging
> and Presence Protocol Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> Title           : PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH) Authors         :
> Matthew Miller Peter Saint-Andre Filename        :
> draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-00.txt Pages           : 16 Date            :
> 2014-02-04
> 
> Abstract: Experience has shown that it is extremely difficult to
> deploy proper PKIX certificates for TLS in multi-tenanted
> environments, since certification authorities will not issue
> certificates for hosted domains to hosting services, hosted domains
> do not want hosting services to hold their private keys, and
> hosting services wish to avoid liability for holding those keys.
> As a result, domains hosted in multi-tenanted environments often
> deploy non-HTTP applications such as email and instant messaging
> using certificates that identify the hosting service, not the
> hosted domain.  Such deployments force end users and peer services
> to accept a certificate with an improper identifier, resulting in
> obvious security implications.  This document defines two methods
> that make it easier to deploy certificates for proper server
> identity checking in non-HTTP application protocols.  The first
> method enables the TLS client associated with a user agent or peer
> application server to obtain the end-entity certificate of a hosted
> domain over secure HTTP as an alternative to standard PKIX
> techniques.  The second method enables a hosted domain to securely
> delegate a non-HTTP application to a hosting service using
> redirects provided by HTTPS itself or by a pointer in a file served
> over HTTPS at the hosted domain.  While this approach is developed
> for use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as
> a Domain Name Association prooftype, it can be applied to any
> non-HTTP application protocol.
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
> tools.ietf.org.
> 
> _______________________________________________ I-D-Announce
> mailing list [email-masked] 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce Internet-Draft
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>